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ARTICLE
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN LAW
AND PRACTICE: CHRONICLING THE
RAPID CHANGE UNDERWAY
JOHN R. MILLS,* ANNA M. DORN,* AND AMELIA COURTNEY HRITZ*
This Article provides a comprehensive examination of juvenile life without
parole ('"LWOP") both as a policy and in practice. Beginning in 2010, the
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution restricts the reach ofJL WOP sentences, first prohibiting it for
non-homicide offenses, then proscribing its mandatory application for any
offense, and, in 2016, clarifying that it may only be imposed in the rare
instance in which a juvenile's homicide demonstrates his or her "irrparable
corruption. " The legislative responses to these cases have been to either
abandon or restrict JLWOP's application. These legislative changes undo
aspects of the rapid expansion of harsh juvenile sentencing policies enacted
across the country starting in the early-1 990s and represent a trend away from
usingfLWOP sentences.
By analyzing JL WOP sentencing data from state departments of corrections,
this Article includes three significant findings. First, among juveniles arrested
for homicide, African American youth receivejLWOP sentences twice as often
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as their white counterparts. Second, a small number of counties are
responsible for alljLWOP sentences nationally and in large disproportion to
their population. Third, JLWOP sentencing dramatically increased during
the same time period that states were enacting harsh juvenile sentencing
laws-laws that are now falling out of favor. The Article offers potential
reasons for these observations, but further study is required to fully explain the
disparities in jLWOP sentencing practices. Such study is warranted because
each observation raises substantial questions about the wisdom and
constitutionality of JLWOP sentences, given the U.S. Supreme Court's
increased interest in restricting its application.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the rapid changes underway in sentencing
juveniles to life without parole ('JLWOP"). It examines both the
rapid changes in the law and in the actual sentencing practices in the
counties and states that continue to sentence juveniles to die in
prison for crimes they commit before reaching eighteen years of age.'
In Miller v. Alabama,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory
life without parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth
Amendment.' In Montgomery v. Louisiana,' the Court said that such a
sentence is "disproportionate . .. for all but the rarest of children, those
whose crimes reflect 'irreparable corruption.'" The Court has explicitly
held open the question of whether any such sentence is constitutional.'
This Article addresses when, where, and on whom JLWOP sentences are
being imposed-questions relevant to its constitutionality.
1. This Article is timely and unique in several respects. First, no prior report
has examined county-by-county sentencing. Second, earlier reports on JLWOP
predate the U.S. Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence and the resulting change to
juvenile justice. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR
LIvEs: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf
(providing an example of a study addressing JLWOP prior to the Court's recent
decisions). As this Article will show, the changes to JLWOP in the last decade will
have profound effects on the JLWOP population. Third, prior studies focused on
total population, combining the impact of JLWOP sentencing with JLWOP arrests,
which obscured the role of the prosecutor and sentence. Id. at 39. In contrast, this
Article examines race andJLWOP as it relates to arrest rate.
2. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
3. Id. at 2475.
4. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
5. Id. at 726 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469) (holding that Miller applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review).
6. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (noting that the Court did "not consider ...
[whether] the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole
for juveniles"). In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the Court
requested briefs arguing whether Miller applies retroactively. One of the briefs filed
in response requested that the Court hear arguments on the constitutionality of
JLWOP. Brief of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice & the
Criminal Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2,
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280). Additionally, State v.
Houston, 353 P.3d 55 (Utah 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-7087 (U.S. Nov. 20,
2015) also presents this issue and is pending before the Court. Most recently, the Court
granted certiorari in State v.Jacobs, 165 So. 3d 69 (La. 2015) (per curiam), vacated sub nom.
Lawence v. Louisiana, 2016 WL 854176 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2016), ultimately vacating the lower
court'sjudgment and remanding the case in light of its holding in Montgomery.
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Examining a comprehensive data set of all persons currently
serving JLWOP sentences,' this Article finds that the vast majority of
JLWOP sentences are the product of sentencing policies adopted
during the height of interest in the myth of the superpredator, are
isolated in a handful of counties and states,' and the states with those
polices are rapidly abandoning them.o The Article also demonstrates
that there are twice as many African American offenders currently
servingJLWOP sentences as their similarly situated white counterparts."
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part One explains the Court's
examination of legislation and sentencing trends as part of its
national consensus analysis, which is relevant to determining whether
sentencing juveniles toJLWOP violates the Eighth Amendment. Part
Two examines the use of JLWOP in law and in practice. It
demonstrates that the dawn of JLWOP sentences are a relatively
recent phenomenon; that more recently, jurisdictions are
abandoning the sentence; and those that impose it do so
disproportionately on persons of color. Part Three discusses a
potential explanation for these trends, including a discussion of the
"Superpredator Era," a period marked by fear of a generation of
violent youth, a group that never materialized.
The implementation-and rapid abandonment-of JLWOP raises
questions about its penological justifiability and constitutionality.
I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANDJUVENILEJUSTICE
A. Evolving Standards ofDecency
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment" is measured against the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."" Because "its
7. See infra Appendix B.
8. See infra Section III.A (noting the timing of the sentences and the theory of
superpredators); infra Section III.B (detailing the policies developed during the
Superpredator Era).
9. See infra Part II (providing statistics of states and counties imposing the
majority ofJLWOP sentences).
10. See infra Section II.C.2 (noting recent abandonment and restriction of
JLWOP sentencing policies and their potential breadth).
11. See infra Section II.C (comparing the statistics of African American and white
juvenile offenders receivingJLWOP).
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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applicability must change as the basic mores of society change,"14 the
U.S. Supreme Court looks to contemporary societal norms." Since
2002, the Court has measured "evolving standards of decency" by
determining whether a national consensus supports categorically
prohibiting a given punishment." If there is a national consensus
against a punishment, the Court will exercise its independent
judgment to determine whether the punishment is proportionate to
the offender and the offense.17
To assess whether there is a national consensus about a particular
punishment, legislative enactments constitute the "clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,"" but "[a]ctual
sentencing practices are [also] an important part of the Court's
inquiry into consensus."" The number of states authorizing a given
punishment, the extent and direction of legislative change addressing
the punishment, and the frequency with which the punishment is
actually imposed"o are all relevant to this analysis." Thus, even where
14. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
15. See RobertJ. Smith et al., The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (and How to Dolt
Better), 35 CARDozo L. REv. 2397, 2406 n.43 (2014) (observing that in trying to
determine the consensus of society, the Court has considered opinions of social and
professional organizations, the findings of public opinion polls, and the views held by
the international community).
16. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12, 316 (2002) (noting the Court's
attempt to evaluate "evolving standards of decency" when determining whether a
given punishment is acceptable under the Eighth Amendment (quoting Trop, 356
U.S. at 101)); see Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion: juvenile
Sentencing Schemes After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CluM. L. REv. 293, 301-02 (2015)
(describing the factors evaluated by the Court in determining "national consensus,"
including public opinion, trends in state legislatures, and international practice).
17. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (holding that "national
consensus" supported a holding that death penalty sentences for crimes committed
as a juvenile are unconstitutional); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-
98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the evolution of the Court's
jurisprudence on sentencing proportionality).
18. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
19. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting JLWOP sentences for non-
homicide offenses committed by persons under age eighteen at the time of the offense).
20. In the context of the death penalty, the "imposition" question is assessed
under at least two criteria: the number of sentences meted out and the number of
sentences enforced, that is, the number of persons actually executed. See Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008) ("Statistics about ... executions may inform the
consideration whether capital punishment. . . is regarded as unacceptable in our
society."), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
21. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470-71 (2012) (observing that the
mere fact that a majority of states allowed imposition of JLWOP sentences on
539
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a practice was once common, a more recent repudiation of that
practice indicates a national consensus against it and suggests that it
violates the Eighth Amendment.
In addition to determining the existence or absence of a national
consensus against a sentencing practice, the Court analyzes whether
the practice is proportionate." To make this assessment, the Court is
"guided by 'the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and
by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose.""' This analysis
examines the penological justifications for the punishment:
incapacitation, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation." "A
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its
nature disproportionate to the offense" and highly relevant to the
Eighth Amendment inquiry." For example, the Court in Atkins v.
Virginia" held that the imposition of a death sentence on an
intellectually disabled person was unconstitutional because, inter alia,
it failed to serve retributive and deterrent functions due to the
impairments inherent to intellectual disability."
Since Atkins, the Court has employed its consensus analysis five
times to strike down extreme sentencing practices.28 These five cases
individuals under eighteen was not enough on its own to preclude the Court from
finding such punishments unconstitutional); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433 (noting
statistics about the imposition of a sentence as relevant); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312
(highlighting a preference for objective factors, such as legislation enacted, in
determining sentencing standards). Other factors, such as opinion polls and the
international community's condemnation of a practice, have been cited by the
Court, but most scholars agree that these other factors have, at most, limited
influence on the Court's conclusions. See Smith et al., supra note 15, at 2406 n.43
(describing such factors as "more atmospheric than substantive").
22. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 ("The concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment.").
23. Id. at 61 (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421).
24. See id. at 61, 67; see also infra note 86 (discussing the Court's use of its
certiorari authority to assure alignment of its independent judgment with the
national consensus).
25. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
26. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
27. Id. at 319-20; accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 183 n.28 (1976)
(asserting that retribution and deterrence are the "two principal social purposes" of
the death penalty, and noting that such a sentence necessarily accomplishes
incapacitation and forgoes all hope of rehabilitation). Similar to the death penalty,
for sentences of life without the possibility of parole, retribution and deterrence are
the only relevant factors justifying the sentence.
28. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) (invalidating a strict IQ cutoff
score of seventy to measure intellectual disability relevant to eligibility for the death
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address death sentences for persons less than eighteen years old at the
time of their offense,' death sentences for non-homicide offenses,"
JLWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses," mandatory JLWOP, " and
a strict IQ score cut-off of seventy for proving Atkins claims."
Three of these five opinions address punishments for juveniles,
suggesting a willingness to invalidate harsh punishments that treat
juvenile offenders as harshly as their adult counterparts, despite a
national consensus against doing so." To find such a consensus and
ban the punishment in these cases, the Court examined legislative
enactments, actual sentencing practices, and the proportionality of
the punishment to the offender and the offense.3 ' The next
subsections examine, respectively, how the Court found a national
consensus in each of the juvenile sentencing cases and its
independent judgment regarding the proportionality of sentencing a
juvenile to serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
B. National Consensus Findings in the Court's Decade ofJuvenile Cases
In the last decade, the Court has shown an increased willingness to
involve itself in the regulation of juvenile justice, issuing four
landmark juvenile justice opinions between 2005 and 2016. Three of
those cases, Roper v. Simmons," Graham v. Florida7 and Miller v.
Alabama," struck down punishments that violated the Eighth
Amendment.39  In holding each of the three sentences
penalty); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (rejecting mandatory
imposition of JLWOP on persons under age eighteen at the time of the offense);
Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (denouncing JLWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses
committed by persons under age eighteen at the time of the offense); Kennedy, 554
U.S. at 447 (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty for non-homicide offenses);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (denying imposition of the death
penalty on those under age eighteen at the time of the offense).
29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
30. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447.
31. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
32. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
33. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.
34. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
35. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, 2469-72, 2471 n.10; Graham, 560 U.S. at 62-71;
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68, 575.
36. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
37. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
38. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
39. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (holding that mandatory JLWOP sentences for
homicide crimes violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82
(prohibiting JLWOP sentence for crimes other than homicide); Roper, 543 U.S. at
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unconstitutional, the Court found a national consensus against the
punishment as a critical part of its analysis. 4 0  This subsection
examines the Court's national consensus analysis in those cases.
In the first case, Roper v. Simmons, the Court found that there was a
national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty on
offenders under eighteen-years-old at the time of their crime.
Fifteen years before this decision, the Court held in Stanford v.
Kentucky42 that executing a person for an offense committed as a
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.4 s In Roper the Court first counted the states that banned
the practice. 4 Thirty states prohibited the execution of offenders under
the age of eighteen: twelve banned the death penalty altogether, and
eighteen exempted juvenile offenders from its reach.4 5
The Court also noted that "the direction of change," namely that
states banned-rather than reinstated-the death penalty for
juveniles after the Court's affirmance of the death penalty for sixteen-
and seventeen-year-olds.4 1 Since the Court's decision in Stanford, five
states abandoned the death penalty for those under eighteen, "four
through legislative enactments and one through judicial decision."47
578-79 (holding that a death penalty sentence is unconstitutional for juveniles).
Prior to Roper v. Simmons, the last time the Court substantively addressed juvenile
justice issues was in two cases decided on June 26, 1989. See Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (ruling that executing someone for a crime committed
when the person was sixteen- or seventeen-years-old did not violate the Eighth
Amendment), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551. A fourth case, JD.B. v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), addressed whether a juvenile's age was relevant to
determining if the juvenile was in custody, triggering the necessity of Miranda
warnings. Id. at 2398, 2408. As noted above, the Court recently held that Miller's bar
on mandatoryJLWOP sentences applies retroactively. See supra note 5. Whether the
opinion did more, as Justice Scalia's dissent suggested, is beyond the scope of this
Article. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of interpreting Miller in a "devious way" to effectively
eliminate JLWOP).
40. See Mir, 132 S. Ct. at 2470-71; Graham, 560 U.S. at 62,67; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68.
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
42. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
43. See id. at 380 (determining that a lack of "societal consensus" existed, and
therefore, imposing the death penalty on sixteen and seventeen year olds convicted
of murder to be constitutional).
44. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
45. Id. (observing that the same number of states prohibited executing the
intellectually disabled when the Court, in Atkins, found a national consensus against
that practice (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002))).
46. Id. at 565-66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
47. Id. at 565.
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No state that previously barred capital punishment for juvenile
offenses had since reinstated it.48
Finally, the Court noted that the total numbers of actual
executions for offenses committed by juveniles was "infrequent.""9 In
the ten years preceding the Court's decision, only three states had
carried out such an execution."o Thus, the Court examined the actual
practice of carrying out the punishment in addition to formal prohibition
of the practice." For these reasons, the Court concluded that
the objective indicia of consensus in this case-the rejection of the
juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of
its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in
the trend toward abolition of the practice-provide sufficient
evidence that today our society views juveniles ... as "categorically
less culpable than the average criminal.""
In the second juvenile sentencing case, Graham v. Florida, the Court
found a national consensus against sentences of life without parole
for non-homicide offenses committed by persons less than eighteen-
years-old at the time of the offense." The Court found a national
consensus against the punishment based on its infrequent use,
"despite its widespread legislative authorization."54
At the time of the opinion, only seven jurisdictions legislatively
prohibitedJLWOP for non-homicide crimes, and just six jurisdictions
had outlawed JLWOP entirely. 5 The Court found, however, that the
sentence was "exceedingly rare" in practice," identifying 123 persons
48. Id. at 566.
49. Id. at 553.
50. Id. at 565 (Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia).
51. Id. at 564-65 (noting that after the Court's decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,
Kentucky's governor elected to spare Mr. Stanford from execution, stating, "[w]e
ought not be executing people who, legally, were children" (alteration in original)).
Doubtlessly, the Kentucky's governor's act of executive mercy had emotional
resonance for the members of the Court who had previously voted to permit Mr.
Stanford's execution, but it is properly understood as peripheral to the Court's
analysis. See generally Smith et al., supra note 15, at 2406 n.43 (characterizing factors
of this sort as "atmospheric" as opposed to "substantive" factors which may play a
more important role in a particular case).
52. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
53. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 55, 57, 67, 82 (2010) (finding that Graham's
JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional because he committed a non-homicide
offense while seventeen years old).
54. Smith et al., supra note 15, at 2451.
55. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
56. Id. at 62, 67.
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serving JLWOP for a non-homicide offense.5 ' The Court found that
even this number was over-representative of the commonality of the
practice: "It becomes all the more clear how rare these sentences are,
even within the jurisdictions that do sometimes impose them, when
one considers that a juvenile sentenced to life without parole is likely
to live in prison for decades."" The Court necessarily assumed that
some of the 123 sentences were imposed based on outdated
sentencing policies and practices." Thus, the Court found that the
total number of sentences, as well as when those sentences were
entered, was relevant to whether there was a national consensus.
The Court also considered whether the sentences actually imposed
were geographically isolated and identified thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia that authorized JLWOP for non-homicide
offenses."o Only eleven states had ever imposed the sentence, and a
single state, Florida, accounted for the majority of JLWOP
sentences.6 ' Thus, the Court found a national consensus against
JLWOP for non-homicide offenses based on when and where the
offenses were imposed and despite de jure authorization of the
offenses in most states.
In the third juvenile sentencing case, Miller v. Alabama, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment required individualized
consideration of the mitigating aspects of youth before exercising
discretion to impose JLWOP." The Court rejected the state's
argument that because twenty-nine jurisdictions statutorily authorized
the punishment, there could be no consensus against it." The Court
noted that when it decided Graham, there were thirty-nine
jurisdictions authorizing JLWOP for non-homicide offenses, and the
57. Id. at 62-64 (citing PAOLO G. ANNINO ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
FOR NON-HOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO NATION 2 (2009)) (clarifying
that the 123 persons does not include juveniles who received JLWOP sentences for
non-homicide offenses at the same time they received a JLWOP sentence for a
homicide offense because "[i]t is difficult to say that a defendant who receives a life
sentence on a nonhomicide offense but who was at the same time convicted of
homicide is not in some sense being punished in part for the homicide when the
judge makes the sentencing determination").
58. Id. at 65.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 62.
61. Id. at 64 (finding that 77 of the 123 individuals serving aJLWOP sentence for non-
homicide offenses were imposed by Florida (citing ANNINO ETAL., supra note 57, at 2)).
62. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012) (remanding two
separate cases of fourteen-year-old defendants who were convicted of murder and
sentenced toJLWOP).
63. Id. at 2471.
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Court nonetheless found a consensus against that punishment.64 It
also noted that "in Atkins, Roper, and Thompson, we similarly banned
the death penalty in circumstances in which 'less than half' of the
'States that permit[ted] capital punishment (for whom the issue
exist[ed])' had previously chosen to do so."6
The Court explained that "the statutory eligibility of a [JLWOP
sentence] does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed
through deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration"
because "more than half' of the twenty-nine jurisdictions with
mandatory JLWOP impose it "by virtue of generally applicable
penalty provisions" that apply, without discussion, to children and
adults alike." The Court thus concluded that there being twenty-
nine jurisdictions authorizing mandatory JLWOP was no bar to an
Eighth Amendment prohibition."
The Court held that two lines of its precedent required
individualized consideration ofjuveniles before imposingJLWOP. Its
recent precedents on juvenile punishment established that "children
are different" when it comes to sentencing. Its death penalty
jurisprudence established the necessity of particularized
consideration of the offender before imposing the most severe
sentences authorized under law.6 Together, these two strands of
precedent required individualized consideration of the juvenile
before imposing a sentence that would necessarily mean the juvenile
would die in prison.o The Court expressly reserved the question of
whetherJLWOP itself violated the Eighth Amendment. 71
64. Id. at 2471-73 (finding a lack of consensus in practice even though thirty-
seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal government all allowed
JLWOP sentences for juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses).
65. Id. at 2472 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original)).
66. Id. at 2473 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 67).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2469.
69. Id. at 2467 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (requiring consideration of a defendant's character and record
prior to imposing death sentence)).
70. Id. at 2467, 2469.
71. Id. at 2469 ("Because [the Court's] holding is sufficient to decide these cases
[at bar], we do not consider Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or
at least for those [fourteen] and younger. But given all we have said in Roper, Graham,
and this decision about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity
for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty will be uncommon.").
545
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In the Court's two most recent Eighth Amendment cases on the
prohibition of capital punishment on the intellectually disabled,
Atkins v. Virginia and Hall v. Florida," its national consensus analysis
proceeded similarly to its jurisprudence in these three juvenile cases.
In Atkins, the Court counted nineteen states-thirty-three when
including states that forbid the death penalty altogether-that had
prohibited the death penalty for the intellectually disabled." As with
Graham, however, the Atkins opinion "forcefully demonstrate [s that]
legislative enactments are not dispositive."" For example, the Court
noted that the fact that states like New Hampshire and New Jersey
still statutorily authorized executions of the intellectually disabled
carried little weight, because no such executions had been carried out in
decades." Put differently, "a state's failure to execute ... individuals for
long periods of time could arguably be construed as evidence that a state
is as good as abolitionist for national consensus purposes. "76
The Atkins Court was also the first case to address the notion of
"direction," explaining that it is "not so much the number of these
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change."" Specifically, the Court noted that seventeen states had
abolished the death penalty for the intellectually disabled since the
Court had denied the Eighth Amendment claim in Penry v. Lynaugh"
and that there was a "complete absence of States passing legislation
reinstating" the penalty for the intellectually disabled."
In Hall v. Florida, the Court held that a strict cut-off score of seventy
and above failed to take account of the standard measure of error in
intelligence quotient tests and was thus contrary to the national
consensus.so In so finding, the Hall Court applied and expanded
upon its national consensus analysis by looking not only to legislation
or practice, but also to professional norms: "The legal determination
72. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
73. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002) (including jurisdictions
that had fully abolished the death penalty).
74. Smith et al., supra note 15, at 2408; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (noting that
some states that have not enacted legislation to prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty on individuals that are intellectually disabled still support a national
consensus against executing the intellectually disabled because the sentence has not
recently been imposed on persons with such a disability in the state).
75. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
76. Smith et al., supra note 15, at 2408.
77. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
78. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
79. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
80. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
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of intellectual disability ... is informed by the medical community's
diagnostic framework."" Because Florida's statute went "against the
unanimous professional consensus," the Court concluded, it was
invalid under the Eighth Amendment."
A critical aspect of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
in juvenile sentencing is whether there is a national consensus against
a punishment.83  The Court examines formal authorization,
including the nature and direction of change regarding
authorization, actual sentencing practices, and whether the sentences
are geographically isolated." Where the sentences are geographically
isolated and from a bygone era, the Court may invalidate a sentence,
even where most states formally authorize it."
C. Independent Judgment About the Proportionality of Sentencing Juveniles
to Life Without Parole
Where the Court finds a national consensus against a punishment,
it may invalidate that punishment where, in the Court's independent
judgment, the punishment lacks the penological justifications of
incapacitation, retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation." Relying
81. Id. at 2000.
82. Id. at 1994, 2000 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological
Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Academy of Psychiatry &
the Law, Florida Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, &
National Association of Social Workers Florida Chapter in Support of Petitioner at
15, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882)).
83. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reliance
on establishing a national consensus in determining constitutionality).
84. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (explaining relevant factors the
Court uses to determine whether there is national consensus).
85. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (referencing the Court's
decision in Atkins which showed a willingness to evaluate imposed sentences and the
general trends of the states).
86. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) ("A sentence lacking any
legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.").
Several commentators have noted that the Court has never found a national
consensus against a punishment where it did not also hold that its independent
judgment required prohibition of the punishments and vice versa. See Meghan J.
Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are
Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 567, 590 (2010) (observing a resurgence
of the Court's reliance on its own judgment in deciding whether a punishment is
suitable); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1730-31 (2000) (adding that the
Court can change its interpretation of the Constitution by exercising its power to
select cases or refuse cases). Perhaps the best explanation for this consistent
convergence is the Court's use of discretion in granting certiorari in cases where the
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on psychological and social science evidence, as well as what "any
parent knows," the Court has consistently held that these purposes
are greatly diminished in the context of imposing extreme sentences
on juveniles." That is, children are inherently less culpable than
their adult counterparts.' They are "more vulnerable" to "negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure."" "Their
own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their
immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than
adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their
whole environment." 0 Thus, the retributive rationale is diminished
for juvenile offenders."
The hallmark features of youth similarly weaken the deterrent
rationale. "[I] mmaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences" diminish the deterrent rationale because those
features are characteristic of youth and undermine a juvenile's ability
to apply future consequences to their present conduct."
Finally, in Roper, the Court held that juveniles are uniquely
amenable to reform. As the Roper Court noted, "the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult."" That ajuvenile is
still struggling to form her or his identity "means it is less supportable
to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is
evidence of irretrievably depraved character."94 Moreover, a sentence
of life without parole is a once and for all finding that a juvenile is
among the few "incorrigible juvenile offenders [and distinguishable]
from the many that have the capacity for change.""
The Court has repeatedly held that the characteristics of youth
weaken the rationales for imposing the harshest available penalties,
and the scientific literature and the Court's authorities continue to
national consensus and its independentjudgment are likely to align. SUP. CT. R. 10
(providing grounds for granting a writ of certiorari).
87. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
88. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
89. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
90. Id. at 553.
91. No greater incapacitation for juveniles is authorized than life without parole.
See id. at 578 (banning death penalty forjuveniles). Thus, the incapacitation value is
at its zenith for such sentences.
92. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
93. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
94. Id. at 553. "Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment
in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that
persist into adulthood." Id. at 570.
95. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010).
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confirm these common-sense holdings.16  For this reason, the
remainder of this Article focuses on the particularities ofJLWOP, first
examining its authorization and implementation and then discussing
potential explanations for the trends present in JLWOP sentencing.
II. STATE ABANDONMENT OFJLWOP IN LAW AND PRACTICE
Rapid change is underway in the area ofJLWOP. Legislatures are
restricting its availability, and its use is highly concentrated, both
within states and counties. This section first examines the state-by-
state changes to JLWOP as a matter of policy. Next, it explains how
JLWOP sentences are being imposed in practice.
A. Methodology and Limitations
This Part's remaining analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it
examines the state-by-state policies regarding JLWOP, with a focus on
statutory law. It provides an overview of the authorization, abolition,
and major changes in the law affecting implementation of JLWOP.
Other than the rapid changes in the law presently under way,97 no
significant limitations affect this part of the analysis.
In the second step of its analysis, this Part examines JLWOP
sentencing practices, employing data from state departments of
corrections. Between May and September 2015, the authors sent out
requests for information regarding the current inmates in each
jurisdiction's prison system serving a sentence ofJLWOP." Specifically,
they sought: the name, date of birth, race, gender, offense date,
sentencing date, age at time of offense, and county of conviction.
Overall, the departments of corrections were very responsive.
The data, where possible, were checked against other public
information.' These sources included any available appellate
96. Id. at 50; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
97. E.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 387 (Iowa 2014) (noting that
"constitutional protection for the rights ofjuveniles ... is rapidly evolving").
98. The authors sought information about the individuals currently serving
JLWOP sentences in order to explore the characteristics of individuals who would be
affected by a change in the JLWOP sentencing practices. Thus, we do not have
information about juveniles who were sentenced toJLWOP but are no longer serving
those sentences. This may occur, for example, if their sentences were commuted to a
term of years or they are no longer living. Therefore, we expect that our data
underestimates the number ofJLWOP sentences per year, especially the earlier years.
99. Louisiana's data was not checked in this manner because its Department of
Corrections declined to provide the names of the persons serving JLWOP sentences.
Email from Genie Powers, La. Dep't of Public Safety & Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research
Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Aug. 13, 2015, 3:11 PM) (on file with author).
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decisions, department of corrections website materials, and news
reports.' With a small handful of exceptions, the publicly available
information confirmed the states' reports.''
Nonetheless, the data some states provided presented certain
limitations. These limitations are detailed in Appendix A,' 02 but are
outlined here. First, several states did not provide information about
race and gender.'o This information was not reliably available from
accessible public information and has been excluded from the
analysis unless provided by state departments of corrections. More
problematically, however, four jurisdictions have declined to provide
data at all: the federal government, Washington, D.C., New York, and
Virginia. None of these jurisdictions appear to be significant users of
JLWOP, and two jurisdictions, New York and Washington, D.C., do
not appear to have any inmates sentenced toJLWOP.' 04
100. See, e.g., Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 380 (appealing the prosecution of a juvenile in
state supreme court); Statistics, STATE OF CONN. DEP'T OF CORR. (2015),
http://www.ct.gov/doc/cwp/view.asp?a=1492&Q=270036 (providing statistics about
the state's incarcerated population); The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.eji.org/node/893 (reporting on the
impact of the Superpredator Era).
101. Sometimes none of this information was available. For those instances, the
data was not confirmed against a second source. In the rare instances in which an
alternative source of information provided conflicting information, it tended to be a
difference in date of offense or sentencing and did not significantly differ from the
department of corrections reports. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 343 A.2d
669, 670 (Pa. 1975) (indicating that offender was fifteen at the time of the offense,
while the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections indicated he was sixteen); Two
Charged in Slaying, NEWS OK (Oct. 20, 1998), http://newsok.com/article/2630214
(indicating the offender was fifteen at the time of his first court appearance, while the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections indicated he was seventeen at the time of his
offense). Thus, even the conflicting information did not meaningfully affect the analysis.
102. See infra Appendix A.
103. California, Florida, and Minnesota did not provide information about race
and gender. Email from June DeVoe, Research Manager, Data Analysis Unit, Cal.
Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., to Anna Dom, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (July
22, 2015, 2:02 PM) (on file with author); Email from Deb Kerschner, Dir. of
Planning & Performance, Minn. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research Fellow,
Phillips Black Project (Sept. 4, 2015, 6:01 AM) (on file with author). Of the 2295
individuals in our data set, we are missing race for 319 (fourteen percent).
104. See THE SENTENCING PROJECr,JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 2
(2015) [hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE],
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jjjuvenile Life_WithoutParole.pd
f (providing a map of jurisdictions that have either banned or limited the use of
JLWOP as of 2016, and indicating that New York and Washington, D.C. currently
have noJLWOP prisoners).
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In addition to withholding information, eight states-Alabama,
Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
Pennsylvania-have reported the number of persons entering the
department of corrections and/or being sentenced to JLWOP before
age eighteen instead of the persons who committed offenses before
age eighteen.1 o5  These states do not record the date of offense;
because of this practice, they likely underreport the total number of
JLWOP sentences, particularly excluding persons sentenced to
JLWOP for offenses committed at age seventeen. Thus, our analysis
of age at the time of offense likely underreports the proportion of
sentences for crimes committed as a seventeen-year-old. Finally, two
states, Ohio and Wisconsin, provided information from 2014 and
2012, respectively, instead of current information.10
Despite the limitations associated with the data from state
departments of corrections, the analysis derives from a robust data
set, drawing on well-vetted sources of information.1 07
One set of analyses in this Article employs the FBI's Supplementary
Homicide Reports ("SHR") to assess how race affects JLWOP
sentences for juveniles arrested for homicide and how juvenile
homicide rates differ from adults.' The SHR contains information
on the majority of murders in the United States and is among the
most reliable crime data available.'o
105. The following jurisdictions did not respond to the authors' request for
information or provided data that was incomplete: Washington, D.C., New York, and
Virginia. Email from Michele S. Howell, Legal Issues Coord., Va. Dep't of Corr., to
Anna Dom, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Aug. 13, 2015, 5:34 PM) (on file with
author); Email from N.Y. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, to Anna Dorn, Research
Fellow, Phillips Black Project (July 27, 2015, 3:08 PM) (on file with author); Letter from
Oluwasegun Obebe, Records, Info. & Privacy Officer, D.C. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dom,
Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (May 21, 2015) (on file with author).
106. Email from Lauren Chalupa, Staff Counsel, Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., to
Anna Dom, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (June 2, 2015, 11:41 AM) (on file with
author); Email from Joy Staab, Dir. of Public Affairs, Wis. Dep't of Corr. to Anna Dom,
Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (June 3, 2015, 7:27 AM) (on file with author).
107. The Supreme Court itself sought out and relied upon reporting from state
departments of corrections to determine the number of persons serving JLWOP
sentences for non-homicide offenses. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63-64
(2010) (referencing letters from prison officials the Court used to create a more
accurate estimate of the number ofjuveniles servingJLWOP sentences in 2010).
108. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to the FBI's
Supplementary Homicide Reports: 1980-2013, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Supplementay Homicide Reports].
109. See Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and
American justice at the End of the Century, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 506, 517 (1997)
(reviewing MICHAEL TONRY, A REVIEW OF MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND
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B. Changes inJLWOP Policies
Since Miller, nine states have abolished JLWOP, bringing the
current number of states completely banning the sentence to
fifteen."o In the states that retain JLWOP policies, the legislatures
and courts have diminished its impact through retroactivity rulings
that provide every juvenile an opportunity to receive a lesser
sentence, reforms to narrow the application of JLWOP, or a
combination of the two.
States that have abolished JLWOP have generally done so in one of
two ways. Most commonly, states ban the sentence outright,
removing authorization for JLWOP as a sentencing possibility. Eight
states have adopted this type of reform."' The other, less common
form of abolition is achieved through a change in parole."' In the
two states that have changed their parole practices, adding parole
eligibility for persons under age eighteen at the time of the offense
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995)) ("Homicide is likely more reliably reported across
socioeconomic, racial, and other social divisions than other crimes."); John J.
Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1423,
1425 (1998) (noting that reliable, long-term data for crime is generally hard to find
outside of homicide); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources
Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14
(1998) ("[T]he crime with the best available data [is] murder."). But see Michael G.
Maxfield, Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 671, 671-72, 689-91 (1989) (discussing sources of error in the
Supplementary Homicide Reports ("SHR") data). The data exclude negligent man-
slaughters and justifiable homicides. Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108.
110. Infra Table 1.
111. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 2(b) (West 2015) (allowing parole for
juveniles between the ages of fourteen and eighteen convicted of first-degree
murder); S.B. 796, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015) (amending CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-125a (2014)); S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013)
(amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4209, -A, -636(b), 4217(f), 3901 (d)); H.B.
2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014) (abolishing life imprisonment without parole
for offenses committed while under the age of eighteen); A.B. 267, 78th Sess. (Nev.
2015) (eliminating the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole
for offenses committed prior to the age of eighteen); S.B. 1083, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2015) (changing parole eligibility for a capital felony committed prior to
reaching eighteen years of age); H.B. 62, 73rd Sess. (Vt. 2015) (prohibiting a
sentence of life without parole for a person who was under the age of eighteen at the
time of the offense); H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (providing that only
people aged eighteen or older may be given life sentences without parole); H.B. 23,
62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013) (providing parole eligibility for lesser offenses
committed prior to reaching the age of eighteen).
112. See S.B. 796, Gen. Assemb.,Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015) (allowing juveniles to go
at large on parole under certain conditions); S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del.
2013) (allowing certain modifications to parole eligibility forjuvenile offenders).
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eliminates JLWOP. Some states enacting the first form of abolition
have explicitly made it retroactive; all states enacting the second form
necessarily did so. Connecticut has undertaken both reforms."' For
this reason, a more detailed explanation of Connecticut's JLWOP
sentencing statute and reforms illustrates the ways in which states
have abolished JLWOP.
Before Connecticut's abolition of JLWOP, it imposed mandatory
JLWOP in certain circumstances. Before April 25, 2012, if a juvenile
committed a murder in which certain aggravating circumstances were
present,"' Connecticut law authorized either JLWOP or the death
penalty."' Because the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty
for persons under the age of eighteen, the juvenile would be
sentenced to JLWOP. "' For offenses committed on or after April 25,
2012, but before the new law took effect, if a juvenile committed a
murder in which one of the same aggravating circumstances was
present, then the sentence would be JLWOP."
Connecticut's new juvenile sentencing law took effect on October
1, 2015.11" That law excludes juveniles from the definition of
aggravated murder."' Thus, it eliminates JLWOP as a sentencing
possibility. The law also creates parole eligibility for those currently
serving JLWOP and other lengthy sentences.12 o It provides that
juveniles are eligible for parole after serving sixty percent of their
sentence or twelve years, whichever is longer."' The law also
provides special criteria for the parole board to weigh when
considering parole for a person incarcerated for a crime committed
as a juvenile."' Additionally, the law provides for appointment of
113. S.B. 796, Gen. Assemb.,Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015).
114. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2011) (enumerating aggravating circumstances).
115. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-35a(1) (A) (enumerating circumstances under
which a capital felony would lead to a death sentence versus life imprisonment
without parole).
116. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (barring death sentences
for crimes committed by juveniles). Connecticut's only known execution of a
juvenile was in 1786, when it executed a twelve-year-old Native American girl for
murder. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., EXECUTIONS IN THE U.S. 1608-2002: THE ESPY
FILE (2002), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ESPYstate.pdf.
117. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-35a(1) (B).
118. S.B. 796, Gen. Assemb.,Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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counsel for indigent inmates a year in advance of their parole
hearing." By its own terms, the law is explicitly retroactive.1 4
The following chart outlines forms of abolition since Miller, its
effective date, and whether abolition is retroactive.
Table 1: Abolition ofJLWOP Since Miller
State Removes Adds Parole Explicitly Effective Date
Sentencing Eligibility Retroactive
Possibility
Connecticut X X X Oct. 1, 2015
Delaware 126 x1 2 7  X June 4, 2013
Hawaii X July 2, 2014
Massachusettsl29 X July 25, 2014
Nevada1 3 0  X X Oct. 1, 2015
Texas 1 3 1  X Sept. 1, 2013
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013).
127. Delaware provides for judicial review, rather than review before a parole
board. Id.
128. H.B. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014) (amending HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 706-656(1), 657 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)); § 706-670 (providing for
appointed counsel in annual parole hearings and a presumption in favor of parole
upon finding a low risk of reoffending).
129. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 72(a) (West 2015) (amended by H.B. 4307
188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2014)) (ensuring that incarcerated juveniles are fully able to
take part in educational and treatment programs or to be placed in a minimum-
security facility; protections which are not afforded to adult inmates); MASs. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (amended by H.B. 4307, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2014)).
Massachusetts's legislative abolition was subsequent to the state supreme court's
holding, as a matter of state law, that discretionary imposition of JLWOP was
unconstitutional. SeeDiatchenko v. Dist Att'y (Diatchenko 1), 1 N.E.3d 270, 284-85 (Mass.
2013). More recently, the state supreme court has held that indigent inmates sentenced
toJLWOP are entitled to counsel and expert services related to their parole hearings. See
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y (Diatchenho fl), 27 N.E.3d 349, 356-57 (Mass. 2015).
130. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 176.025 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (amended by A.B.
267, 78th Sess. (Nev. 2015)) (requiring consideration of the mitigating aspects of
youth anytime a juvenile is sentenced as an adult, and rendering prisoners who are
currently serving JLWOP sentences eligible for parole as follows: (A) if the offense
did not result in death, the prisoner is eligible for parole after fifteen years of being
incarcerated; (B) if the offense did result in death, after twenty years of
incarceration). Nevada's retroactivity provision does not apply to persons "convicted
of an offense or offenses that resulted in the death of two or more victims." A.B. 267,
78th Sess. (Nev. 2015).
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West Virginia X X June 6, 2014
Wyoming 13 4  X X X July 1, 2013
Vermont1 3 5  X May 14,2015
Both forms of abolition have the same effect. They indicate
legislative thinking on the practice, the "clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values."13 1 When Hawaii banned
JLWOP, its legislature declared, "Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's
moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as the youth matures
into an adult and neurological development occurs, the individual can
become a contributing member of society."13 ' The legislatures in these
states have explicitly declared their objections toJLWOP.
The states barring JLWOP are fewer than the Court counted in
Atkins when it barred imposing the death penalty on the intellectually
disabled.13 ' However, the "consistency [and] direction" of the
change in JLWOP policy is as strong or stronger than in cases where
131. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (a) (1) (West 2015) (passed in June 2013).
132. H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (enacting W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 61-
11-23 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)). West Virginia's law also requires "the parole board
[to] take into consideration the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to
that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner during incarceration." § 62-12-13b(b).
133. All persons "convicted of one or more offenses for which the sentence or any
combination of sentences imposed is for a period that renders the person ineligible
for parole until he or she has served more than fifteen years shall be eligible for
parole after he or she has served fifteen years if the person was less than eighteen
years of age at the time each offense was committed." § 61-11-23(b).
134. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-101(b), 6-10-301(c), 7-13-402 (2015) (outlawing
JLWOP both by amending the first-degree murder scheme as applied to juveniles
and by making those serving JLWOP parole eligible unless they have, while
incarcerated for JLWOP, committed assault with a deadly weapon on a law
enforcement officer or attempted an escape).
135. H.B. 62, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2015) (enacting VT. STAT. ANN. 13, § 7045
(2015)). See E-mail from David Turner, Vt. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research
Fellow, Phillips Black Project (June 1, 2015, 05:50 AM) (on file with author) (noting
that Vermont had no one serving JLWOP at the time of passage, and, therefore,
retroactivity is unlikely to be an issue).
136. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
137. H.B. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014).
138. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15 (detailing that prior to Penry, only Georgia and
Maryland prohibited the death penalty for the intellectually disabled but that after
Penry, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana,
Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri,
North Carolina, and Texas also banned the practice).
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the Court has addressed the issue."' In the thirteen years between
Penry and Atkins, sixteen states eliminated the death penalty for the
intellectually disabled.140 In the fifteen years between Stanford141 and
Roper,"' five states eliminated the death penalty for juveniles."' The
elimination rate for these respective punishments was roughly 1.23
and 0.33 jurisdictions per year.1 4 4
In the years since Miller, the states' responses have been much
quicker. On average 3.33 states per year have eliminated JLWOP,
and six jurisdictions have eliminated the punishment since June
2014.145 In response to Miller, a case that merely restricts the
punishment, states are eliminating JLWOP all together, suggesting
that Miller has caused states to examine their sentencing practices
and, once scrutinized, abolish them."' Moreover, as in Atkins and
Roper, no state without JLWOP has chosen to enact it, and no state
has expanded its application.1 47 The direction, consistency, and rate
of change all suggest a mounting consensus againstJLWOP.
States that have retained JLWOP after Miller blunted its impact by
granting resentencing hearings to inmates subject to mandatory
JLWOP sentences and by narrowing the reach of their JLWOP
schemes. At least sixteen state courts have held that Miller provides
retroactive relief to juveniles whose sentences are final,"' with some
139. Id. at 315.
140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565 (2005).
141. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
142. 543 U.S. 551.
143. Id. at 565.
144. See id. (noting that in thirteen years, sixteen states eliminated the death
penalty for the intellectually disabled, or 1.23 states per year, and showing that five
states in fifteen years eliminated the death penalty for juveniles).
145. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
146. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 66-67 (2010) (noting that existence of the
possibility of a sentence via a provision transferring juveniles to adult court does not
amount to an acceptance of the range of sentencing outcomes that a juvenile would
be subject to in adult court).
147. See supra Table 1; notes 125-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
number of states that have abolished or restricted application ofJLWOP); infra notes
148-68 and accompanying text (discussing further how some states have limited use
ofJLWOP beyond what Miller requires).
148. See Kelley v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277 at 6, 465 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Ark. 2015)
(holding that fundamental fairness requires retroactive application of Miller), cert.
denied, 2016 WL 854232 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2016); State v. Randles, 334 P.3d 730, 732-33
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (same), cert. denied, No. CR-14-0306-PR, 2015 Ariz. LEXIS 126
(Ariz. Apr. 21, 2015); In re Rainey, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(same), cert. granted, 326 P.3d 251 (Cal. 2014); Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d
1031, 1035 (Conn. 2015) (same), cert. denied, 2016 WL 854311 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2016);
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explicitly doing so on state law grounds.1 4 9  Four of those states
passed legislation to ensure that Miller would apply retroactively. 50
As discussed in more detail below, these retroactivity holdings mean
that scores of inmates were already entitled to resentencing hearings,
even before the Court's ruling in Montgomery.151
Countless more will not be subject to JLWOP because of states'
substantive limitations on the reach of their JLWOP sentencing
schemes. 152 For example, before a recent overhaul to its JLWOP
policies, California made juveniles eligible for JLWOP if any one of
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015) (same); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709,
722-23 (Ill. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014); State v. Ragland, 836
N.W.2d 107, 121-22 (Iowa 2013) (same); Diatchenko l, 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013)
(same); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013) (en banc) (same); Branch v.
Cassady, No. WD77788, 2015 WL 160718, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2015) (same);
State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Neb. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 67
(2014); In re State, 103 A.3d 227, 236 (N.H. 2014) (same), cert. denied sub nom., New
Hampshire v. Soto, 2016 WL 854309 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2016); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d
572, 576 (S.C. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015); Dickerson v. State,
2014 WL 3744454, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 2014) (same); Ex parte Maxwell,
424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508
(Wyo. 2014) (same).
149. See Randles, 334 P.3d at 732 (finding that Miller applies retroactively according
to the plain language of Arizona's amended statutes); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963-64
(finding Miller retroactive under its own three-prong Witt analysis); Branch, 2015 WL
160718, at *6 (finding that Miller applies retroactively under Missouri's adoption of
the broader Linkletter-Stovall test).
150. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-402(a)-(b) (2015) (denying retroactive
application to prisoners who either assaulted a prison guard while in custody or
attempted to escape); Randles, 334 P.3d at 732 (finding resentencing for Miller relief
applies retroactively according to the plain language of Arizona's amended statutes);
S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013); S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., 2013 Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2013) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.510, -.540, -.6332, -
.729, 9.95.425, -.430 (West Supp. 2015)).
151. At least two states have granted retroactive relief to persons serving
discretionary JLWOP sentences. Those states held that the sentences violated Miller
because the statutory schemes at the time did not require consideration of youth as a
mitigating factor. See State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890, 894-99 (Ohio 2014) (agreeing with the
U.S. Supreme Court that juveniles who commit criminal offenses are not as culpable as
adults); Aiken, 765 S.E.2d at 576-77 (entitling youth with JLWOP sentences to a
resentencing hearing in which age will be considered as a mitigating factor).
152. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (entitling a juvenile to
present mitigating evidence as part of his case for a sentence less than JLWOP, and
observing that once such information is meaningfully presented, the Court expects
imposition ofJLWOP sentences "will be uncommon"); see also Miss. STATE PUB. DEF.,
OFFICE OF CAPrrAL DEF. COUNSEL, MONTHLY AcnVmTEs REPORT 8-9 (May 2015)
[hereinafter MIssissIPPi MONTHLY AcnvrnEs REPORT] (on file with author) (observing
that data from Mississippi support the Court's hypothesis in Miller that a significant
portion ofJLWOP resentencing cases result in a sentence less thanJLWOP).
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twenty-two special circumstances existed, circumstances that are
present in almost every first-degree murder case.'5 1 In 2012,
California dramatically narrowed JLWOP eligibility.154 Under the
revised statute, a person serving can "submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing" after serving fifteen years, unless
the JLWOP sentence is "for an offense where the defendant tortured ...
[the] victim" or where "the victim was a public safety official." 155
If the petition is not granted, the inmate has additional
opportunities to petition again after serving a total of twenty and twenty-
five years.' 5 6  This change in policy dramatically limits the scope of
JLWOP,' transforming California from having one of the most widely
applicable JLWOP schemes to having one of the narrowest.' 58
California is not alone. Florida has passed similar legislation,'5 9
and three additional states-North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Washington-have eliminated JLWOP for a class of offenders.o
North Carolina eliminated JLWOP for felony murder, restricting the
sentence to persons convicted of premeditated and deliberate first-
degree murder.' 6 ' Pennsylvania eliminated JLWOP as an option for
153. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2014) (enumerating special circumstances,
including felony murder). See generally Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California
Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (1997)
(noting that California's death penalty eligibility, which set the criteria for JLWOP
sentences, is "arguably the broadest such scheme in the country").
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (2) (A) (i)-(ii) (West 2015).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 1170(d) (2) (A), (H).
157. Of course, California continues to authorize JLWOP in name for a broad array of
homicide offenses. However, as this discussion demonstrates, most of the persons
technically subject toJLWOP will, in fact, have the opportunity to be paroled.
158. See generally PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE AFTER
MILLER V. ALABAMA 2-3, https://www.phillipsblack.org/s/Juvenile-Life-Without-
Parole-After-Miller.pdf (describing JLWOP availability in each authorizing
jurisdiction). While examining the case files of the 288 people presently serving
JLWOP sentences in California would provide a means for examining how much
narrower California's amended statute actually is, such an undertaking was beyond
the scope of this project.
159. H.B. 7035, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (enacting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 775.082(1) (b), 921.1401 (West Supp. 2015)).
160. The Eastern District of Michigan has also ruled that Michigan's parole statute
is unconstitutional because it permitsJLWOP pursuant to Michigan's old mandatory
JLWOP sentencing scheme. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 769.25 (West Supp. 2014);
Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013)
(declining to address retroactivity, but nonetheless providing many inmates
sentenced prior to Michigan's change in JLWOP sentencing with an opportunity for
release), appeal filed, No. 13-2705 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17(a), 15A-1340.19B (2013).
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juveniles convicted of second-degree murder, whereas prior to the
amendment second-degree murder called for automatic JLWOP.16 2
Finally, Washington retroactively eliminated JLWOP for individuals
who were under sixteen when they committed their crimes."'
Illinois and New Hampshire have both recently raised the
jurisdictional age for adult court eligibility, limiting the availability of
JLWOP and other adult sentences for juvenile offenders in those
states." Connecticut and Massachusetts have also recently raised
their jurisdictional age. 6 1 Other states have either eliminated
mandatory minimums for juveniles,1 6 required consideration of the
mitigating aspects of youth before sentencing a juvenile to a lengthy
term,'67 or improved the reliability of parole hearings.' Each
162. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(c) (Supp. 2012); Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d
286, 293 (Pa. 2013) (vacating a JLWOP sentence and remanding for further
consideration under the new statutory scheme).
163. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(3) (a) (i) (Supp. 2015).
164. See H.B. 2404, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111. 2013) (amending 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/5-120 (West 2015)) (changingjurisdictional age from seventeen
to eighteen); H.B. 305, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2015) (amending N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. 169-B:4 (Supp. 2014)) (changingjurisdictional age from sixteen to seventeen).
165. See H.B. 6638, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2011) (amending CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121 (Supp. 2015)) (changingjurisdictional age to eighteen); H.B.
1432, 188th Gen. Court, Spec. Sess. (Mass. 2013) (amending MAsS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
119, § 72 (West 2015) (changingjurisdictional age from seventeen to eighteen)).
166. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 389 (Iowa 2014) ("[T]he legal
disqualifications placed on children as a class ... exhibit the settled understanding
that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal." (quoting J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403-04 (2011))); see also State v. Taylor, 854
N.W.2d 420, 421 (Iowa 2014) (finding a mandatory minimum sentence "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Iowa state constitution).
167. See Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1047-48 (Conn. 2015)
(holding that courts must consider mitigating features of youth before imposing a
fifty-year sentence); People v. Sanders, No. 1-12-1732, 2014 WL 7530330, at *9, *10
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (asserting the trial court should have considered mitigating
features of youth before imposing consecutive forty and thirty-year sentences); State
v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (holding that sentencing courts are required
to consider youth as a mitigating factor for a sentence that would end when the
juvenile was in his sixties, explaining "[e]ven if lesser sentences than life without
parole might be less problematic, we do not regard the juvenile's potential future
release in his or her late sixties after a half century of incarceration sufficient to
escape the rationales of Graham or Miller).
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041, 3046, 4801 (West 2011) (setting standards for
review of cases in parole hearings); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (entitling indigent persons sentenced for juvenile offenses
to counsel to assist in preparation for parole hearings); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11
§ 4204A(d) (Supp. 2014) (setting time guidelines for parole hearings based on age
and the crime committed); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.081(1) (b), 921.1402 (West 2014)
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change signals a growing intention to treat juveniles differently from
adults, even if they are somewhat modulated for purposes of assessing
a national consensus onJLWOP.
States are rapidly abandoning and limiting the availability of
JLWOP. The direction, consistency, and speed of the change
manifest a growing consensus against the practice.
C. JLWOP Actual Sentencing Practices Demonstrate It Is an Outdated,
Disfavored Practice, Disproportionately Imposed on Children of Color
Careful review of the actual JLWOP sentencing practices in the
states that retain JLWOP reflects its diminishing role in juvenile
justice. The imposition ofJLWOP sentences over time demonstrates
that the overwhelming majority ofJLWOP sentences were imposed in
the mid-1990s in a handful of jurisdictions pursuant to policies
adopted at the height of fear over the myth of the superpredator.'
1. MostJLWOP sentences were imposed in the mid-1990s
Current JLWOP sentences were overwhelmingly imposed during
the mid-1990s. As discussed below, this was an era when forty-five
states changed their laws7 e during hysteria over a "coming
generation of super-predators.""' The change in laws expanded the
applicability ofJLWOP. This period saw a marked increase inJLWOP
sentences, despite a drop after 1994 in homicides committed by
juveniles.172 The criminal justice policies of the 1990s track the
nitimlier ofJLWOP sentences being served.
(entitling juveniles sentenced to terms greater than fifteen years to sentencing review
after fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,110.04(1) (2014)
(entitling persons who were sentenced when they were less than eighteen to have an
adverse parole decision revisited annually and in light of enumerated factors); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 62-12-13(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) (requiring parole boards to
consider the mitigating circumstances of youth when making parole decisions); see
also Diatchenko II, 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015) (holding that indigent juvenile
offenders are entitled to counsel and expert assistance to ensure meaningful
opportunity for release pursuant to parole board decisions).
169. See infra Part III.
170. JESSICA SHORT & CHRISTY SHARP, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF Am.,
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACr IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2005),
http://66.227.70.18/programs/juvenilejustice/disproportionate.pdf.
171. Hearings on the juvenile justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Before the
Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth & Families of the H. Comm. on Econ. & Educ.
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 89-90 (1996) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, H.Judiciary Comm.).
172. SHORT & SHARP, supra note 170, at vi.
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The nation's focus on the generation of superpredators is curious
in light of the proportion of homicides committed by juveniles. As
demonstrated in the figure below, in any era, including the period in
which states changed their juvenile laws, adult homicide arrests dwarf
the number ofjuvenile homicide arrests, and juvenile homicide arrests
generally trend in the same direction as adult homicide arrests.
Figure 1: Number offuveniles and Adults Arrested for Homicide Between
1980 and 20137
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Nonetheless, the imposition of JLWOP sentences increased, even
as homicide rates fell."' Between 1986 and 1994, arrests for violent
crimes committed by juveniles, including homicide, rose.'
However, that rate fell sharply between 1994 and 2000, even as
JLWOP sentences were peaking.176  Moreover, the rise in juvenile
homicide arrests in the 1980s and early 1990s might be better
understood as "narrower bands of behavior," specifically "a thin band
of highly lethal gun attacks ... and garden variety assaults" than as a
national crime wave.177 Under either analysis, the rise in JLWOP
sentences was not concurrent with the rise in juvenile homicides, and
juvenile homicides made up only a small fraction of all homicide
173. Easy Access to the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Reports: 1980-2013, OFF. OFJUV.
JusT. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr (select "Known
Offender Crosstabs" hyperlink, then select "Year of Incident" as the "Row Variable"
and "Age of Offender" as the "Column Variable").
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 727, 728 (1998).
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arrests."' Thus, the emphasis on changing juvenile sentencing
policies arrived during a period of waning juvenile violence."'
Figure 2: Number ofJuveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole Per Year'o
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There is a sharp uptick in the imposition of JLWOP sentences
during the same period of rapid expansion ofJLWOP eligibility. This
upswing occurred despite juvenile homicide arrests falling in the
same timeframe.'8 ' The percent of life without parole sentences per
homicide arrest was between one percent and two percent from 1980
to 1993.' Between 1994 and 1999, the rate of JLWOP sentences
increased, and in 1999, eleven percent of juveniles arrested for
homicide were sentenced to JLWOP.'1 3 Likewise, the rate ofJLWOP
sentences per homicide arrest remained at or above four percent
until 2013, the most recent year for which the homicide arrest data is
available.' While the increased imposition of JLWOP sentences
does not track an increase in crime, it follows a change in juvenile
justice policies that expanded its applicable scope.
178. Id. at 742.
179. Id. at 744.
180. This information comes from responses to the authors' FOIA requests and is
on file with the authors. See infra Appendix A (detailing the results of authors' FOIA
requests and the limitations of the authors' data collection).
181. See Zimring, supra note 177, at 742; supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
182. This information was compiled by comparing responses to the authors' FOIA
requests to statistics available in the FBI's SHR. Responses to the authors' FOIA
request are on file with the authors. See Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108.
183. Id.; supra Figure 2.
184. Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108; supra Figure 2.
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Figure 3: Rate ofJLWOP Sentences Per Juvenile Arrest for Homicide"'
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A handful of jurisdictions-California, Florida, Louisiana,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania-are responsible for imposing two-thirds
of allJLWOP sentences.' Amidst the nationwide changes to juvenile
sentencing policies, these key jurisdictions made changes to their laws
expanding eligibility for JLWOP. In 1991, Louisiana required
juveniles as young as fifteen to be tried as adults for certain crimes,
including homicide.8 ' In 1995, Pennsylvania specified that all
juveniles charged with murder would be tried as adults." In 1996,
Michigan extended adult jurisdiction to juveniles as young as
fourteen."s' Finally, Florida and California have both made multiple
changes to the way they impose JLWOP. In 1994, Florida lowered its age
of eligibility for transfer to adult court for serious offenses to fourteen
years old.' 90 In 1997, Florida required that all juveniles indicted for a
crime carryingJLWOP as a potential sentence be tried as adults. "'
Since 1976, California has placed every person less than eighteen-
years-old under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and gave that
185. This information was compiled by comparing responses to the authors' FOIA
requests to statistics available in the FBI's SHR. Responses to the authors' FOIA
request are on file with the authors. See supra Figures 1-2.
186. See infta Appendix B.
187. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305 (2014) (enacted by H.B. 939, 1991 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (La. 1991)).
188. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (Supp. 2012) (enacted by S.B. 100, 179th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Pa. 1995)).
189. MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.606 (2015) (enacted by H.B. 4486, 1996 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 1996)).
190. 1994 FLA. LAws 1240 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.049 (1993)). See generally
Michael Dale, juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOvA L. REv. 139, 140
(1994) (exploring changes to Florida law made during the 1994 legislative session).
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.56(1) (West 2014) (enacted by H.B. 1369, 15th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997)).
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court discretion to decide whether a juvenile was unfit to proceed in
juvenile court, listing some offenses where the juvenile was presumed
to be unfit.'" If the juvenile was sixteen or older and committed
certain offenses, including those carrying a JLWOP sentence, the
adult court was presumed to have jurisdiction." In 2000, via
Proposition 21, California removed that discretion and mandated
that all juveniles ages fourteen through seventeen indicted for certain
crimes, including all crimes carrying JLWOP as a potential sentence,
be tried as adults.1 9 4
A review of California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania's sentencing practices confirms that JLWOP sentences
in these high-use jurisdictions were affected by changes to the states'
juvenile sentencing policies.
Louisiana's JLWOP sentences dramatically increased after its 1991
expansion ofJLWOP eligibility.1 9 5
Figure 4: JLWOP Sentences in Louisiana'"
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Michigan expanded its juvenile transfer laws in 1996, broadening
the scope ofJLWOP there.' Michigan is a notable exception in that
192. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 602, 607 (West Supp. 2015) (amended by 1976
Cal. Stat. 4819); People v. Cardona, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 317-20 (Ct. App. 2009).
193. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602; Cardona, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 317-20.
194. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 602(b) (amended by 2000 CAL. LEGIS. PROP. 21,
http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/propositions/21text.htm); see also Cardona,
99 Cal. Reptr. 3d at 317-19 (applying the new statutory framework).
195. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305 (2014) (enacted by H.B. 939, 1991 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 1991)); E-mail from Genie Powers, La. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dorn,
Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Aug. 13, 2015, 3:11 PM) (on file with
author) (providing a complete list of all persons servingJLWOP sentences).
196. Id.; see also infra Appendix B (reporting that 247 individuals are serving
JLWOP sentences in Louisiana).
197. MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.606 (2015) (enacted by H.B. 4486, 1996 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 1996)).
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its JLWOP sentences sharply increased prior to the change
broadening JLWOP's potential impact. However, as discussed below,
Michigan's peak in the mid-1990s is in keeping with other social and
political change that was underway throughout the country.
Figure 5: JLWOP Sentences in Michiganl9 8
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198. See E-mail from Andrew Phelps, Assistant FOIA Coordinator, Mich. Dep't of
Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Oct. 20, 2015, 2:43 PM)
(on file with author) (providing a complete list of aIlJLWOP sentences in Michigan);
Appendix B (reporting that 370 individuals are serving JLWOP sentences in
Michigan).
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Pennsylvania saw a spike in JLWOP sentences after requiring all
juveniles charged with homicide to be tried as adults.'99
Figure 6: JL WOP Sentences in Pennsylvaniaoo
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There are no JLWOP sentences being served in Florida that were
imposed before the state changed its transfer laws in 1994, when it
lowered its age of eligibility for transfer to adult court for serious
offenses to fourteen years old.20' Florida's JLWOP sentences spiked
after 1997, when it required all juveniles charged with an offense
carrying a potential sentence ofJLWOP to be tried as adults.2 02
199. See 42 PA. CONs. STAT. § 6302 (Supp. 2012) (enacted by S.B. 100, 179th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Pa. 1995)); E-mail from Andrew Filkosky, Agency Open
Records Officer, Pa. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research Fellow, Phillips Black
Project (Aug. 3, 2015, 9:00 AM) (on file with author) (providing a complete list of all
persons serving JLWOP sentences in Pennsylvania).
200. E-mail from Andrew Filkosky, Agency Open Records Officer, Pa. Dep't of
Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Aug. 3, 2015, 9:00 AM)
(on file with author) (providing a complete list of all persons serving JLWOP
sentences in Pennsylvania); see abo infra Appendix B (reporting that 414 individuals
are serving JLWOP sentences in Pennsylvania).
201. E-mail from Dena French, Fla. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dorn, Research
Fellow, Phillips Black Project (June 30, 2015, 10:29 AM) (on file with author)
(providing a complete list of all persons servingJLWOP sentences in Florida).
202. Id.; see alo FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.56(1) (West 2014) (enacted by H.B. 1369,
15th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997)).
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Figure 7: JLWOP Sentences in Floda203
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Finally, California's expansion of adult jurisdiction in 2000 and the
concomitant expansion of JLWOP eligibility produced more JLWOP
sentences there.20o Its earlier upswing in the mid-1990s may reflect a
change in the number of transfers being sought, the number being
granted, or the number of cases affected by presumptive transfer. 201
Regardless, the uptick reflects the national trend: a mid-1990s
upswing in imposition ofJLWOP sentences.
Figure 8: JLWOP Sentences in California`on
35
30
25
20 __ ___
15 - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -__
20 - - ------ - -
00-
r 1Z Xc C4 I- a) X) a000 0 0 C- -j) oo X) a) a) a) all a 01 C (Z 0 0
- - - - - - - Cl 1 Q-4 (14 0.1 0.4 0' 0 1 0.
-California
203. Id.; see also infra Appendix B (reporting that 227 individuals are serving
JLWOP sentences in Florida).
204. See supra note 192-94.
205. See SHORT & SHARP, supra note 170, at 7 (describing the uptick in juvenile
transfers throughout the United States during 1990s).
206. Email from June DeVoe, Research Manager, Data Analysis Unit, Cal. Dep't of
Corr. & Rehab., to Anna Dorn, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Aug. 14,
2015, 12:47 PM) (on file with author) (providing a complete list of all persons
servingJLWOP sentences in California); see also infra Appendix B (reporting that 288
individuals are serving JLWOP sentences in California).
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The sentencing practices in these jurisdictions confirm thatJLWOP
sentences increased generally at the same time that states undertook
changes to their juvenile justice policies. These changes took place
despite little apparent relationship to actual changes in homicide rates.
2. Recent policy changes limit the ongoing impact ofJLWOP, including in
the jurisdictions that retain it and have used the sentence the most
Changes in state juvenile sentencing policy will likely limit the
ongoing impact of JLWOP sentences, independent of Montgomery's
effect, 2 07 as states abandon the policies they enacted during the
height of JLWOP sentencing. Since Miller, six states have abolished
JLWOPo.2 " Among the states that retain the sentence, substantial
restrictions limit its impact. California, Florida, and Pennsylvania,
three of the top five users of JLWOP, have each recently passed
significant reforms to their JLWOP laws, narrowing their
applicability.o' In Michigan-also among the top five-the state's
failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for release has been held
unconstitutional, with an appeal pending.210 The particular effects of
these reforms remain to be seen, but some of the most frequent users
of the sentence are restricting their use of the practice.
Moreover, accounting for both retroactivity holdings requiring
resentencing and substantive reforms to statutes, the true number of
persons subject to JLWOP is likely far lower than the 2295 reported
by the departments of corrections.21 ' This subsection details the
impact of recent reforms on the number of persons serving valid
JLWOP sentences.
207. The impact of Montgomery is beyond the scope of this Article. However, at
least some early commentary on the decision suggests that Montgomery is an
expansion of Miller, potentially applying even to discretionary sentences of life
without parole. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life
Sentences for Youthful Criminals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:26 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01 /opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-life-
sentences-for-youthful-criminals ("[TIhe ruling's clarification-or, apparently, its
expansion-of Miller will now rule out all life-without-parole sentences for juveniles
who commit crimes before age of eighteen, unless prosecutors can prove to a judge
that a particular youth is beyond saving as a reformed person.").
208. See supra Section II.B (describing the two ways that states have abolished
JLWOP both before and after Miller).
209. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (highlighting a shift to
limitingJLWOP eligibility in these states).
210. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-2661 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2013).
211. See infra note 215.
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Prior to Montgomery, thirteen states had either passed legislation or
issued final retroactivity rulings that may entitle inmates serving
JLWOP sentences entered prior to the respective jurisdictions' post-
Miller change in sentencing practices to a new sentencing
proceeding.2" Five hundred and ninety-two persons are currently
serving a sentence ofJLWOP in those states, and, as a result of these
holdings, may have an opportunity for a new sentencing proceeding.
Five hundred and ninety-two, however, likely overstates the scope of
potential resentencing proceedings because, for example, some states
have restricted their retroactive relief to exclude narrow categories of
JLWOP sentences.21 3 An additional 354 persons are serving JLWOP
sentences in Michigan for convictions imposed prior to eliminating
mandatory JLWOP in 2014 and will be eligible for parole if the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms a lower court decision
providing every person sentenced to Michigan's mandatoryJLWOP with
an opportunity to seek parole. 2 14 Depending on how frequently JLWOP
212. Juveniles serving JLWOP sentences in Delaware, Washington, Wyoming,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina,
Massachusetts, and Texas may have been entitled to new sentencing proceedings
even before the Court's ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13402(a) (2015); State v. Randles, 334 P.3d 730, 732-33 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that Arizona's statutory amendments applied retroactively
and required the court to modify a JLWOP defendant's sentence), cert. denied, No.
CR-14-0306-PR, 2015 Ariz. LEXIS 126 (Ariz. Apr. 21, 2015); Kelley v. Gordon, 465
S.W.3d 842, 846 (Ark. 2015) (holding that Miller applies retroactively to JLWOP
defendants); Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 955-56 (Fla. 2015) (same); People v.
Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (111. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (same); Diatchenko I, 1 N.E.3d 270, 276
(Mass. 2013) (same); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (en banc)
(same); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 719 (Neb. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 67-68 (2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014) (same), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68 (same) (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508 (Wyo. 2014) (same); S.B. 9, 147th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013); S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). Given
the Court's holding in Montgomery, namely that Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012), which held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide
offenders violated the Eighth Amendment, applies retroactively, persons subject to
such a sentence in every U.S. state are entitled to resentencing proceedings.
213. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (2) (A) (i)-(ii) (West 2015) (sentencing
review unavailable for those convicted of torture murder or murdering a police
officer); H.B. 7035, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (enacting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 775.082(1) (b), 921.1401 (West Supp. 2015)) (retroactive review unavailable for
those previously convicted of certain felonies).
214. See Hill, 2013 WL 364198, at *1-2 (noting that Miller must be applied
retroactively because to do otherwise would be "an intolerable miscarriage of
justice"); see also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 769.25-.25a (West 2014) (outlining
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is imposed in these resentencing hearings, the total number of JLWOP
sentences being served may become much lower than it currently is.2 1 5
Preliminary data from Mississippi and Washington suggest that
inmates receive a sentence with the possibility of parole in as many as
four out of five cases.2 16 California and Florida, with 288 and 227
inmates, respectively, have passed legislation dramatically limiting the
availability of JLWOP.21 1 Likewise, Pennsylvania, with 414 current
inmates, has eliminated JLWOP for persons sentenced to second-
degree murder.2
procedures used to resentence individuals whose sentences were determined to be
unconstitutional after Miller); infra Appendix B (reporting that 370 individuals are
currently servingJWLOP sentences in Michigan).
215. The total sentences are 2295. Excluding the sentences from Arizona (33),
Arkansas (57), California (288), Delaware (5), Florida (227), Illinois (93), Iowa (2),
Michigan (370), Mississippi (68), Missouri (103), Nebraska (27), New Hampshire
(5), South Carolina (37), Tennessee (13), Texas (17), Washington (22), and
Wyoming (4), reduces the total to 924.
As noted above, the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Virginia Department of
Corrections did not provide substantive responses to requests for public information.
Thus, information about their JLWOP populations is from other sources. See Louis
Hansen, Bill Would Help Va. Juveniles Reduce Life Sentences, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Jan. 9,
2014), http://hamptonroads.com/2014/01/bill-would-help-va-juveniles-reduce-life-
sentences (reporting that Virginia has at least twenty-two persons serving JLWOP
sentences); Federal Stats: Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole Sentences in the Federal
System, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH (June 2011),
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/the-issue/federal-stats (reporting that there are at
least thirty-eight individuals serving JLWOP sentences for crimes committed when
they were younger than eighteen).
216. MISSISSIPPI MONTHLY ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra note 152, at 9 (reporting that
of the seventeen JLWOP sentences that have been reevaluated as of May 2015, eight
individuals were resentenced to life with parole, two were resentenced to life without
parole, and seven were still waiting to be resentenced); Mitch Ryals, Juvenile Who
Killed Elderly Spokane Woman Given New Sentence, INLANDER (Sept. 24, 2015, 3:37 PM),
http://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2015/09/24/juvenile-who-killed-
elderly-spokane-woman-given-new-sentence (noting recent resentencing proceedings
in Washington resulting in exclusively parole eligible sentences).
217. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text; infra Appendix B.
Pennsylvania has not yet ruled on whether its repeal of JLWOP for second-degree
murder is retroactive. See PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 158, at 77-78 (noting
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not find that Miller should apply
retroactively). Discerning the full extent of the reforms in these three states would
require examination of each of the case files of the people subject toJLWOP in those
states. In light of the history of JLWOP in those states, this would be a worthwhile
undertaking, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
218. See PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 158, at 77-78 (noting that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not find that Miller should apply retroactively); infra
Appendix B. Discerning the full extent of the reforms in these three states would
require examination each of the case files of the people subject to JLWOP in those
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Recent changes in eligibility for JLWOP-including state court
holdings making those changes retroactive-mean that many of the
people currently subject to the sentence may no longer be. Thus, the
total number of persons subject to a valid sentence ofJLWOP may be
much lower than Departments of Corrections have reported.
3. JLWOP sentences are concentrated in a handful of outlier jurisdictions
Only a handful of jurisdictions are responsible for most JLWOP
sentences;2 19 ten counties alone account for nearly thirty-five percent
of all JLWOP sentences nationwide. 2 20  Three counties, which
represent 4.1% of the U.S. population, are responsible for over twenty
percent of all sentences. 221 A similar trend holds for sentences overall,
sentences in the last decade, and sentences in the last five years.
The following tables detail the individual counties that are the top
ten imposers of JLWOP sentences, both overall and over the last
decade. The tables include the number of sentences imposed, the
population of the county as a percentage of the total U.S. population
in 2014, and the percentage of totalJLWOP sentences it imposed.
states. In light of the history of JLWOP in those states, this would be a worthwhile
undertaking, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
219. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (including California, Florida,
Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania).
220. Infra Table 2; Appendix C.
221. Infra Table 2; Appendix C.
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Table 2: Concentration of Sentences by County, 1953-2015: Top Ten
SentenceS2d 2
County, State Sentences County Percentage of
Population as Total Sentences
Percentage of (n=2295)
Total U.S.
Populations 22
Philadelphia, PA 214 0.5% 9%
Wayne, MI 156 0.5% 7%
Los Angeles, CA 112 3.1% 5%
Orleans, LA 72 0.1% 3%
Cook, IL 65 1.6% 3%
Oakland, MI 49 0.3% 2%
St. Louis City, MO 41 0.1% 2%
East Baton Rouge, LA 35 0.1% 2%
Allegheny, PA 34 0.4% 1%
Jefferson, LA 33 0.1% 1%
222. Infra Appendix C.
223. State & County QuickFacts: Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42003.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
(indicating 2014 population of 1,231,255); State & County QuickFacts: Cook County,
Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 17/17031.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating 2014 population of 5,246,456); State & County
QuickFacts: East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22033.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
(indicating 2014 population of 446,042); State & County QuickFacts: Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/
22051.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating 2014 population of 435,716); State
& County QuickFacts: Los Angeles County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
(indicating 2014 population of 10,116,705); State & County QuickFacts: Oakland County,
Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/26125.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating 2014 population of 1,237,868); State & County
QuickFacts: Odeans Parish, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating 2014 population of
384,320); State & County QuickFacts: Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42101.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2016) (indicating 2014 population of 1,560,297); State & County QuickFacts: St.
Louis (City), Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
29/2965000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating 2014 population of
317,419); State & County QuickFacts: Wayne County, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/26163.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
(indicating a 2014 population of 1,764,804); QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2016) (indicating 2014 population of 318,857,056).
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A single county, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, accounts for
nine percent of all JLWOP sentences nationwide. Its proportion of
JLWOP sentences is eighteen-fold its proportion of the U.S.
population. Three counties account for over twenty percent of all
JLWOP sentences. Orleans Parish, Louisiana has a proportion of
JLWOP sentences that is thirty-one fold its proportion of the U.S.
population. With the exception of Los Angeles County, California,
each of the counties among the top ten sentencers is responsible for
JLWOP sentences far out of proportion to its population. Thus, Los
Angeles's inclusion as a top sentencer can, in part, be explained by its
large population. The same is not true for the other counties in this
list. Sentences in the last decade have followed similar trends.
Table 3: Concentration of Sentences by County, 2006-2015: Top Nine
SentencerS 224
County, State Sentences County Population as Percentage of Total
Percentage of Total 2006-2015 (a=504)
U.S. Population
225
Los Angeles, CA 29 3.1% 7%
Wayne, MI 22 0.6% 4%
Philadelphia, PA 18 0.5% 4%
Miami-Dade, FL 13 0.8% 3%
Sacramento, CA 12 0.5% 2%
Orleans, LA 11 0.1% 2%
Harris, TX 11 1.4% 2%
Allegheny, PA 10 0.4% 2%
Oakland, MI 9 0.4% 2%
224. This information comes from responses to the authors' FOIA requests and is
on file with the authors. See infra Appendix A (detailing the results of authors' FOIA
requests and the limitations of the authors' data collection). Hillsborough and Palm
Beach Counties in Florida, along with San Diego County in California, each have
eightJLWOP sentences.
225. State & County Quickacts: Hanis County, Teas U.S. Cavsus BUREAu,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48201.htrnl (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
(indicating a 2014 population of 4,441,370); State & County QuidiFacts: Miamiade County,
lIoida, U.S. CENsus BuRFAu, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12086.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating a 2014 population of 2,662,874); State & County QuickFacts
Sacramento County, Cahfomia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045215/06067 (1 last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (indicating a 2014 population of
1,482,026); supra note 223 (providing U.S. Census data for Los Angeles, California;
Wayne, Michigan; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Orleans, Louisiana; Allegheny,
Pennsylvania; and Oakland, Michigan).
573
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEw
Remarkably, many of the overall high sentencers are also among
those imposing a high number of sentences in the last ten years.
Although East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parishes in Louisiana are
not included in the top ten sentencers in the last decade,"' each of
those jurisdictions has imposed seven JLWOP sentences. Five
counties and one parish are in the top ten on both lists: Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania; Wayne County, Michigan; Los Angeles County,
California; Orleans Parish, Louisiana; Oakland County, Michigan;
and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
This handful of jurisdictions is responsible for a large portion of
JLWOP sentences, both historically and in the last decade. Moreover,
like the overall sentencing trend, JLWOP sentencing in the last ten
years has, with the exception of Los Angeles County, been largely
disproportionate to the population of those jurisdictions.
As with counties, JLWOP sentences are concentrated in a small
handful of states: only nine states account for over four-fifths of
227JLWOP sentences.
Figure 9: JLWOP Use by State2 1
9 States: PA,
,I MI, CA, LA, 41 States and,
FL, MO0, I L, IFederal
NC, MS Government
81% 19%
226. Infta Appendix C.
227. JOHN R. MILLS ET AL., PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, No HoPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME
SENTENCES FORJUVENILE OFFENDERS 2 (2015), http://staticl.squarespace.com/static/
55bd511ce4b0830374d25948/t/5600cc2Oe4bOf36b5caabe8a/1442892832535/JLWO
P+2.pdf; infta Appendix B.
228. Infra Appendix B.
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California and Florida recently limited the availability of JLWOP
sentences, and Pennsylvania and North Carolina have eliminated it
for second-degree murder and felony murder, respectively. 229  In
light of the significant role that these states play in JLWOP, both
historically and in recent years, these changes could have a profound
impact on JLWOP sentences going forward.
Both overall and in recent years, states have limited their use of
JLWOP in practice, even if the sentence is statutorily available." In
addition to the jurisdictions that have abolished JLWOP, Indiana,
Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island
currently have no one serving a JLWOP sentence.2 3 ' An additional
four states have five or fewer persons serving a JLWOP sentence from
any period,3 and, in addition to those, five states have one or no
persons serving a JLWOP sentence imposed in the last five years.
At the state level, the use ofJLWOP is increasingly isolated.
4. African Amenican juveniles are disproportionately sentenced tojLWOP
The majority of JLWOP sentences are imposed on African
American juveniles. There are more than double the number of
African American juveniles serving JLWOP compared to white
juveniles; 1303 of the juveniles serving JLWOP are African American,
compared to 531 juveniles who are white.
229. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (noting thatJLWOP sentences
have been limited by a variety of state changes in the law).
231. E-mail from Christine M. Blessinger, Ind. Dep't of Corr., to Anna Dom,
Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (May 21, 2015, 05:08 AM) (on file with
authors); E-mail from Scott Fish, Dir. of Special Projects, Me. Dep't of Corr., to Anna
Dom, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (May 28, 2015, 06:19 AM) (on file with
authors); E-mail from Catherine Earl, Office of Gen. Counsel, N.M. Corr. Dep't, to
Anna Dorn, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (May 22, 2015, 01:15 PM) (on file
with authors); E-mail from Kathleen Kelly, Chief Legal Counsel, R.I. Dep't of Corr.,
to Anna Dorn, Research Fellow, Phillips Black Project (Sept. 29, 2015, 2:51 PM) (on
file with authors); see AMNESTY INT'L & HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2
(noting that no inmates were serving JLWOP sentences in New Jersey as of 2005);
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 104, at 2
(suggesting that New York does not currently have anyjuveniles servingJLWOP).
232. Idaho (4), Ohio (5), New Hampshire (5), North Dakota (1). See infra Appendix B.
233. Alabama (0), Arkansas (1), Iowa (1), Maryland (1), Minnesota (0). See infra
Appendix B.
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Table 4: Race offuveniles ServingJLWOP..
Race n (n=1981) %
African American 1303 65.8%
White 531 26.8%
Hispanic 120 6%
Asian 17 1%
American Indian 10 1%
One possible explanation for the race differences in JLWOP
sentences is that the arrest rates are also different. If African
American juveniles are arrested in similar proportions to JLWOP
sentences, the racial disparity may be attributable to policing policies,
rather than sentencing. To examine whether the racial disparity in
JLWOP sentences can be explained by differences in arrest rates, we
compared our JLWOP dataset with the SHR from 1980 to 2013.3
The SHR contains information on the majority of murders
committed in the United States and is regarded as among the most
reliable crime data.236
Of the individuals who have been arrested for murder and non-
negligent manslaughter between 1980 and 2013, fifty-six percent were
African American and forty-one percent were white.23" Therefore,
JLWOP sentences are imposed upon African American juveniles in
disproportion to their homicide arrest rate: African American
juveniles make up fifty-six percent of the individuals arrested for
murder and non-negligent homicide and sixty-six percent of the
individuals sentenced to JLWOP. "
234. Infra Appendix B. We were missing race data from 318 individuals in our
dataset. This includes all of the individuals serving JLWOP sentences in California
(n=288) and Minnesota (n=7).
235. Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108.
236. Valerie P. Hans et al., The Death Penalty: Should the Judge or the Jury Decide Who
Dies?, 12J. EMPiRicAL LEGAL STUD. 70, 84-85 (2015).
237. Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108.
238. See infra Figure 11 (showing that arrest rates between African Americans and
whites have been relatively similar over the same time period).
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Table 5: Race ofJuveniles Arrested for Murder and Non-negligent Homicide,
1980-2013239
Race n (n=48,188) % of those arrested
African American 27,109 56%
White 19,779 41%
Asian 877 2%
American Indian 423 1%
Next we used SHR data to calculate the portion of JLWOP
sentences per reported homicide for white and African American
juveniles. 240 By comparing the proportion of JLWOP sentences per
reported homicides, we are able to control for the overall number of
homicide arrests within each racial group.
Figure 10: JLWOP Sentences Per Homicide Arrest"
All White Youth
B Y
Black Youth
239. Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108. The SHR does not record
Hispanic Ethnicity. Id.
240. We did not calculate sentencing rates for Hispanic juveniles because the SHR
does not record Hispanic Ethnicity. In addition, we do not report the sentencing
rates for Asian and Native American juveniles because few Asian and Native
American youths are arrested and at most one or two Asian and Native American
youth are sentenced toJLWOP a year.
241. These rates were calculated by comparing the authors' JWLOP sentencing
data to arrest rates from the SHR. See Supplementay Homicide Reports, supra note 108;
infra Appendix B (reporting the number of JLWOP sentences being served in each
state); see also infra Appendix A (detailing the results of authors' FOIA requests and
the limitations of the authors' data collection).
4.50%
4.00%
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
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The results confirm that African American juveniles are
disproportionately sentenced to JLWOP compared to white juveniles.
While five percent of African American juveniles arrested for murder
are sentenced to JLWOP, only three percent of white juveniles are
similarly sentenced.24 2 The disparate impact described here accounts
for the varied arrest rates between African Americans and whites.
That is, the disparity is not because one group is more often arrested
for homicide than the other is-the disparity necessarily arises at
some point after the arrest.
The disparity in JLWOP sentencing has been present since 1980,
the first year of our SHR data, but it increased after 1992.24 A chi-
square test of independence revealed that this effect is statistically
significant. 244 The chi-square statistic tests whether the number of life
sentences varies significantly across the race of the youth and the
period during which he or she was sentenced. 24 5  The association
here means that it is unlikely that the results were the product of
chance and did not involve a relationship between race and time of
sentencing. 246 Since 1992, the portion of African American juveniles
sentenced toJLWOP has increased.
The disparity reported here is attributable only to events occurring
after arrest. This leaves only charging discretion, conviction rates, and
sentencing discretion. The latter was largely only present after
Miller.247 Thus, the disparity is likely attributable to either a higher
conviction rate for non-whites or to racially disparate charging practices.
242. Supra Figure 10. These rates were calculated by comparing the authors'
JWLOP sentencing data to arrest rates from the SHR. Supplementary Homicide Reports,
supra note 108.
243. Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 108.
244. Chi-square is a common statistical test used frequently in the social sciences. See,
e.g., Stephanie Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-
1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 549, 579 (2006) (employing chi-square analysis).
245. X2(2, N= 758) = 9.35, p< .05.
246. "A p-value is a measure of how likely it is that one would obtain results at least
as skewed as those shown even if the differences were, in fact, simply random
variation. A p-value of 0.05 or less is generally considered to be statistically
significant and evidence of a relationship between the two variables at issue."
Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study ofProsecutorial Decision-
Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 305, 330 n.98 (2009).
247. See generally PHILLIPS BLACK PROJEcr, supra note 158, at 2-3 (outlining JLWOP
eligibility in each U.S. jurisdiction before and after Miller v. Alabama).
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Figure 11: Rates ofJLWOP Sentences per juvenile Arrested for Homicide
Based on Race ofJuvenile"'
7% - - - - - - - _-_----- - -
6% T- 1
5% -- ----
4%
3%
0%lckot7 .0
1980-1991 1992-2004 2005-201
SWhiteYouth 1.34% 3.20% 2.69%
O Black Youth 2.20% 5.48% 4.96%
Qualitatively, it is difficult to explain the racial disparities of
JLWOP sentences in race-neutral terms, particularly for some
jurisdictions. For example, Texas has had no whites and only has
non-whites serving JLWOP sentences.2 4' The U.S. Census reports
that, in 2014, Texas's population was 43.5% white, non-Hispanic. 250
Other states also have highly disparate rates of imposing JLWOP
sentences on non-whites, including Illinois (81.7% of the JLWOP
population; 37.7% of the total population), Louisiana (81% of the
JLWOP population; 40.7% of the total population), Mississippi
(69.1% of the JLWOP population; 42.7% of the total population),
North Carolina (88.5% of the JLWOP population; 35.9% of the total
population), Pennsylvania (79.5% of the JLWOP population; 22.1%
of the total population), and South Carolina (70.3% of the JLWOP
population; 36.1% of the total population).2 1  Non-whites are
248. Infra Appendix B. The standard error represents the amount of variation in
the sample. For each year, the majority of the arrest rates will fall within the error
bars. Because the error bars do not overlap for white and black youth from 1992-
2004 and 2005-2013, these groups are likely to be significantly different.
249. Infra Appendix B. Before abolishing JLWOP, Texas imposed it on seventeen
people: thirteen are black and four are Hispanic.
250. State & County Quick Facts. Theas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
251. State & County Quick Facts: iinois, U.S. CENSUSBUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/17000.html (lastvisited Mar. 27, 2016); State & County QuickFacts: Louisiana, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016);
State & County QuickFacts: Mismi)V4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
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overrepresented among the JLWOP population in ways perhaps
unseen in any other aspect of our criminal justice system. This kind
of disparity harkens back to the inequitable sentencing practices that
developed during the Jim Crow Era. 2
These findings are especially remarkable and alarming because
prior research suggests that rate of arrest is a larger source of racial
disparity in the administration of juvenile justice.' Moreover,
similar studies of the death penalty most often find racial disparities
based on the race of the victim, or the interplay between the race of
the defendant and victim.' Here, we find significantly different
sentencing practices for African American and white youth without
taking into account the race of the victims. Based on the experience
with the death penalty, we would expect an even greater disparity
between African American youth accused of killing white victims and
white youth accused of killing African American victims.
A complete accounting of the race of defendants as well as an
examination of additional variables, such as the race of the victim and
the aggravating circumstances present in each case, would uncover
the defendants most at risk for a JLWOP sentence. However, these
qfd/states/28000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016); State & County Quick Facts: North
Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016); State & County Quick Facts: Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42000.htmI (last visited Mar. 27,
2016); State & County Quick Facts: South Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016);
infra Appendix B. Percentages were rounded to the nearest tenth.
252. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Social Scientist in Court, 65 J. oF CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 239, 242 (1974) (studying application of capital rape statutes for
convictions in eleven southern states from 1945 to 1965, and finding that black
defendants with white victims were sentenced to death eighteen times more
frequently than any other combination).
253. See HOwARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CENTER FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 188 (2006),
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/nr2006.pdf (finding that racial
disparity is most pronounced at the arrest stage of the juvenile justice system).
254. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 140-41 (1990) (finding that the race of the victim effects
Georgia's administration of the death penalty); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro,
Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide
Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 55 (1984) (finding similar results across
jurisdictions); Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical
Study, 97 IOwA L. REV. 1925, 1939-40 (2012) (finding dramatically higher death
sentencing rate where the victim is white and the defendant is African American).
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nuances would not undermine the principal finding here: there is a
significant racial disparity inJLWOP sentencing.255
III. THE MYrH OF THE SUPERPREDATOR AND THE RISE OFJLWOP
SENTENCES
In the 1990s, the same period which saw a dramatic upswing in
JLWOP sentences and significant changes to policies permitting
those sentences, some political scientists were promoting the idea
that a group of youth, unhinged from moral restraints, would
endanger the safety and well-being of everyone in their paths. They
coined the term "superpredator" to describe the group of juveniles
who would commit atrocious, violent acts for seemingly insignificant
reasons."' At the same time, legislatures in forty-five states passed
laws that expanded the application of adult sentences to persons less
than eighteen years old. Although there was a short-lived upswing in
violent crimes-committed by both adults and juveniles-there is
little empirical evidence for what has now been recognized as the
superpredator myth. In light of the significant changes in policy and
sentencing, we have described this period as the Superpredator Era.
The racial undertones, now widely acknowledged to undergird the
superpredator myth, may explain the disparities in JLWOP
sentencing beginning around the same time that the superpredator
myth gained national prominence. Whether the sentencing
outcomes are a product of the myth or whether both are the product
of a larger phenomenon is, in some ways, beside the point. Both
point to a larger problem regarding how the state administers its
harshest penalties. Race plays a significant role when the only
appropriate question should be whether "the juvenile offender will
forever be a danger to society . . . [such that the] sentence . .. make [s
the] judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible."25 7
The following discussion of the superpredator myth is intended to
provide one possible explanation for the dramatic shift in policies
and sentencing outcomes that took place in this era. We do not, and
could not, conclusively identify the myth as the source of the
disparity. However, its prominence and influence during the same
period that saw a rise in both total JLWOP sentences imposed and in
255. See supra Section II.C.4.
256. See John Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov.
27, 1995), http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/8160.
257. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
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the disparity of imposition suggest a discussion of the superpredator
myth is warranted.
A. Creation of the Myth
Twenty years ago, Princeton academic John Dilulio coined the
term "superpredator" to refer to an impending wave of dangerous
juvenile offenders. 5 1 Specifically, he predicted "tens of thousands of
severely morally impoverished juvenile [s]" who "fear[ed] neither the
stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment" and who were
"capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for
the most trivial reasons."' A number of influential criminologists at
the time adopted Professor Dilulio's theory and rhetoric, anticipating an
upcoming surge of "radically impulsive, brutally remorseless" juveniles,
armed with guns and having "absolutely no respect for human life." 260
Criminologist James Fox publicly admonished: "Unless we act today,
we're going to have a bloodbath when these kids grow up."26 1
Throughout the 1990s, the superpredator myth captured popular
and political imaginations. In 1996, Newsweek published an article
warning of a "generation of teens so numerous and savage that [they
will] take violence to a new level."2 6 2 Former Florida congressman
Bill McCollum warned subcommittee members to "brace themselves
for the coming generation of super-predators.""2  In a speech before
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, President Bill
Clinton warned about dangerous children whose "hearts can be
turned to stone by the time they're [ten] or [eleven] years old."'26
258. See Dilulio, supra note 256 (exploring factors that push youth to become
"super crime-prone young males").
259. Id.
260. See The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, supra note 100 (tracing the rise and
fall of the Superpredator Era).
261. Id.
262. SuperpmdatoArrive NEWSWEEK (Jan. 21,1996,7:00 PM), http://www.newsweekcom/
superpredators-arrive-176848.
263. Hearings on the Juvenile justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth and Families of the H. Comm. on Econ. and Educ.
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 90 (1996) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Crime, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
264. Clinton Cites Need for Role Models, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at 3, 1994
WLNR 5440091.
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The language invoked to describe the "superpredator" evoked
race-based sentiments without explicitly mentioning race.2 65 There
was, however, "little difference between the description of mainly
inner city African-American youth as 'superpredators' and the
historic representations of African-Americans as violence-prone,
criminal, and savage."2 6 1 Media reports during this time depicted
these "teen killers" and "young thugs" primarily as children of
color.2 6 ' A 1999 study based on nineteen local news programs across
the country found that non-white youth appeared in crime news
significantly more often than white youth (fifty-two percent versus
thirty-five percent).' Likewise, a 2000 study of national news
accounts found that sixty-two percent of stories about Latino youth
were about homicide, despite youth of color accounting for less than
fifty percent of all violent juvenile crime arrests around this time.2 1
The media also exaggerated the connection between race and
dangerous crime. 270  A 1996 study found that Los Angeles media
outlets were twenty-two percent more likely to depict African
American offenders committing violent crime than nonviolent crime,
while in reality they were equally likely to be arrested for both.2 11 On
the other hand, white offenders were thirty-one percent more likely
to be shown committing a nonviolent crime, when in reality they were
only seven percent more likely to be arrested for a nonviolent
272
crime. News reports similarly exaggerated interracial crime.
Between 1990 and 1994, interracial homicides were twenty-five
percent more likely to be reported by the Los Angeles Times than
intra-racial homicides.2 11 Ultimately, in the public consciousness,
"superpredator" became a "code word for young Black males."274
265. Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice Caught Between The Exorcist and A Clockwork
Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 715, 720-21 (2002) (explaining that terms like
superpredator "carry silent, racially charged messages").
266. Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the
Juvenile justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 679, 712 (2002).
267. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., How the Media Misrepresents Juvenile Policies, 12 CRIM.
JusT. 37, 38 (1998).
268. Loiu DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN
THE NEWS 21 (2001), http://cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf.
269. Vincent M. Southerland, Youth Matters: The Need to Treat Children Like
Children, 27J. Civ. RTs. & ECON. DEV. 765, 771 (2015).
270. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 268, at 4-5.
271. Id. at 15.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 16.
274. Nunn, supra note 266, at 712.
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The racial underpinnings of the defining myth for the
Superpredator Era extended beyond the depictions promoting it and
reached the core assumptions underlying it as a social theory. In
1992, psychiatrist Dr. Frederick Goodwin organized an initiative to
study inner-city violence.27 5 In choosing to focus on the inner city,
Dr. Goodwin explained, "maybe it isn't just careless use of the word
when people call certain areas of certain cities jungles,"7 making
references to hyper-aggressive male monkeys. 7 Professor Dilulio
also played a major role in implanting race-based assumptions into
the superpredator narrative. In his 1995 Weekly Standard article, he
wrote that the "surge in violent youth crime has been most acute
among black inner-city males."*2  In 1996, he wrote an article
entitled My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, in which he described the
increasing "black crime rate, both black-on-black and black-on-white,"
and predicted that "as many as half of these juvenile super-predators
could be young black males."7 Similarly, a 1996 report of the Dean
of Northeastern University's College of Criminal Justice predicted
that "the next wave of youth crime" would be attributed to an increase
in the population of African American males. 28  Thus, racialized
media accounts and the academic underpinnings of the coverage
played a role in defining the Superpredator Era and its resulting policies.
B. Resulting Policies
Media coverage of violent crimes by juveniles coupled with
ominous predictions might have led state legislatures during this era
to expand harsh sentencing options for juveniles."' One
commentator wrote: "Racial imagery and racially biased political
appeals played an important role in creating the climate that led to the
enactment of this legislation.""' From 1992 to 1999, forty-nine states
275. Rutherford, supra note 265, at 723.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Dilulio, supra note 258.
279. John J. Dilulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J. (1996),
http://www.city-journal.org/html/my-black-crime-problem-and-ours-I 1773.html.
280. JAMES AIAN Fox, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF
JUVENILE OFFENDING 3 (1996).
281. The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, supra note 100.
282. Sara Sun Beale, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile justice
Reforms as Seen from fena, Louisiana, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 514 (2009).
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and the District of Columbia amended their transfer statutes to make it
easier for juveniles to be tried in adult court and face adult sentences.2 83
These states enacted changes such as lowering the minimum age of
transfer, expanding the catalogue of offenses that allowed for or
required transfer, and shifting discretion from judges to prosecutors
in charging decisions.2 " By 1999, more than half of the states had
mandatory transfer provisions for certain offenses, often removing all
judicial discretion from the process.8 In some states, transfer
statutes were amended to reach children as young as ten.286 By 1997,
seventeen states had amended their juvenile sentencing statute's
purpose clauses to stress the objectives of public safety and offender
accountability, as opposed to the previous goal of rehabilitating
delinquent youth.8 Following these statutory changes, increasing
numbers of juveniles were prosecuted in the adult system, with
expanded vulnerability toJLWOP sentences.
C. Only a Myth
The predicted surge of juvenile crime never occurred. By 2000,
the juvenile homicide rate had stabilized below its 1985 level, as
confirmed by the very criminologists who predicted the crime wave. 8
Recently, in a complete about-face, Dilulio and Fox were among a
group of criminologists who submitted an amicus brief in support of
the petitioners in Miller, arguing that mandatory JLWOP violated the
Eighth Amendment.2" The brief detailed comprehensive research
demonstrating that predictions regarding the superpredator were
wrong and admitted that the myth created "an ill-suited and excessive
punishment regime."21o Thus, the remaining unchanged
283. SHORT & SHARP, supra note 170, at 7.
284. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., NAT'L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES
AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 14-15
(1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172836.pdf; Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of
Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22
NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y9, 12-13 (2008).
285. Feld, supra note 284, at 13.
286. Id.
287. PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE 6-9 (1998),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf.
288. The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, supra note 100.
289. Id.
290. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 37,
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9647, 10-9646).
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Superpredator Era statutes, including those expanding the availability
ofJLWOP, may be described as vestiges of debunked social theories.
To be sure, the superpredator myth does not tell the whole story.
The surge in JLWOP sentences, in some places, predates Dilulio and
Fox's first articles on the superpredator myth. However, their now
discredited theory was part of an era of expanded treatment of youth
as adults and increased JLWOP sentences. It thus may provide an
important piece of the puzzle in explaining both the sharp rise in
JLWOP sentences and its racialized application.
CONCLUSION
An examination of juvenile life without parole, both in law and in
practice, raises substantial questions about its wisdom and
constitutionality. The stark racial disparities raise particularly
troubling questions about its ongoing legitimacy. African American
juvenile offenders are sentenced to JLWOP at almost twice the rate of
white juvenile offenders per homicide arrest."' For juveniles
sentenced to mandatory JLWOP sentences, this means that the only
source of the disparity is in the prosecutor's charging decision and in
the jury's guilt determination. In discretionary JLWOP regimes, the
source of disparity is with the prosecutor, the jury, or the sentencer. *
An examination of the cause of racial disparities in sentencing is
beyond the scope of this Article. Future research should examine the
JLWOP cases more closely to determine whether charging,
conviction, and/or sentencing decisions are being made, consciously
or unconsciously, based on race.2 " If those decisions are conscious,
those servingJLWOP sentences pursuant to those decisions should be
entitled to relief from their sentences."' Even if the decisions are
291. See supra Section II.C.4.
292. See supra Section III.B.
293. See supra Section II.A.
294. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (explaining that to establish
an equal protection violation, criminal defendants must show "the decisionmakers
[sic] in his case acted with discriminatory purpose"); see also United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (holding that a defendant must produce
credible evidence that similarly situated individuals of different races could have
been prosecuted but were not in order to establish entitlement to discovery in
selective prosecution cases based on race); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating
Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial justice Act, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 519, 529 (1995) (noting that proving discriminatory impact
would be very difficult because "racism is often unconscious, or usually, at the least,
not openly expressed, [and] such proof will rarely be available"). See generally Angela
J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
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unconscious and do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,
they are plainly bad policy. Either source of disparity raises questions
about our criminal justice system's ability to fairly and rationally mete
out its harshest punishments on juveniles, some of the most
vulnerable people it is responsible for sentencing.
States, however, are abandoning those policies. Only three
counties, which account for approximately four and one-tenth
percent of the total population, are responsible for over one-fifth of
all sentences nationwide."' In the last decade, that trend has
continued, as six counties account for one-fifth of all JLWOP
sentences in that timeframe."' On a state level, nine jurisdictions
account for over four-fifths of allJLWOP sentences.
The states and counties that have been the most frequent users of
JLWOP have recently adopted substantial limitations to their JLWOP
policies.2" The rate, direction, and consistency of the change in
JLWOP statutes, together with its waning use, where still available,
indicate our nation's evolving standards of decency regardingJLWOP
sentences and could result in its prohibition under the
Constitution.9 The policy's potential relationship to the
superpredator myth and its implementation now require rigorous
examination to determine whether it possesses any legitimate
penological justification.
13, 18 (1998) (examining the increasing difficulty in challenging discretionary
decisions that have a discriminatory effect and proposing the use of racial impact
studies to address the issue).
295. See supra Section II.C.3.
296. See supra Section II.C.3.
297. See supra Section II.C.3.
298. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Section L.A (summarizing the evolving standards of decency); supra
Part II (discussing how states are moving away from imposingJLWOP sentences).
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APPENDIX A
ALABAMA
The Alabama Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of all nineteen persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as
of June 29, 2015. Alabama provided an updated list on August 13,
2015, after its original list erroneously included individuals who had
entered the penal system prior to age eighteen, but whose JLWOP
offenses occurred after the age of eighteen.
Because the Alabama Department of Corrections tracks only the
admission date and not offense or sentencing dates, the reported
number is approximate. The Alabama numbers do not capture
inmates sentenced to JLWOP who were under eighteen at the time of
the offense, but who were not admitted to the prison system until
after age eighteen. They likely underreport the number of totalJLWOP
sentences. In particular, they likely underreport the total number of
JLWOP sentences for offenses committed at age seventeen, as these are
the sentences most likely to be imposed after age eighteen.
The offense dates were provided not by the Alabama Department
of Corrections, but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
ALASKA
The Alaska Department of Corrections has confirmed that there
are zero persons serving a JLWOP sentence, current as of May 26,
2015. Alaska has never authorized JLWOP.
ARIZONA
The Arizona Department of Corrections provided a complete list of
all thirty-three persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as
of June 29, 2015. The number of persons serving aJLWOP sentence
in Arizona will likely decrease, as in 2014 an Arizona appellate court
interpreted Arizona's statutory Miller fix as applying retroactively,
giving all persons subject to JLWOP in Arizona an opportunity to
seek resentencing.so
300. See State v. Randles, 334 P.3d 730, 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, No.
CR-14-0306-PR, 2015 Ariz. LEXIS 126 (Ariz. Apr. 21, 2015); H.B. 2593, 51 Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014).
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ARKANSAS
The Arkansas Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of all fifty-seven persons serving JLWOP sentences that was
current as of May 20, 2015.
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in Arkansas will
likely decrease because, in 2015, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review, giving all persons
subject toJLWOP in Arkansas an opportunity to seek resentencing. 01
CALIFORNIA
The California Department of Corrections provided a complete list of all
288 persons servingJLWOP sentences that was current as ofJuly 8, 2015.
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in California
will likely dramatically decrease because, since Miller, California has
passed two juvenile sentencing bills that effectively reduce the
"aggravating circumstances" making a person eligible for JLWOP
from twenty-two to two. The law applies retroactively, likely making
most persons currently serving JLWOP no longer eligible for the
sentence. Finally, the law provides for improved parole review, making
the opportunity for release more meaningful once resentenced. o2
The sentence dates were not provided by the California
Department of Corrections, but were collected from other sources:
namely, case law, the California Court of Appeals website, and news
articles regarding the offenses. Where a sentence date could not be
located, date of appellate filing is listed a close approximation, as
appeals must be filed within sixty days of the date of the judgment or
order for felony cases."
The California Department of Corrections did not provide race or
gender, pointing to title 15, section 3261.2 of the California Code of
Regulations, which does not include race and gender as types of
personal information that the Department is authorized to release.'04
COLORADO
The Colorado Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of the fifty-six persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
301. See Kelley v. Gordon, 465 S.W.3d 842, 842-43 (Ark. 2015).
302. See S.B. 9, 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170
(West 2014)); S.B. 260, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (amending CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 3041, 3046, 4801 and enacting § 3051).
303. See CAL. R. OF CT. § 8.308.
304. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 15, § 3261.2 (2016).
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May 20, 2015. Duplicate names represent multiple JLWOP sentences
imposed. Colorado no longer authorizes JLWOP. Colorado
abolishedJLWOP in 2006.so5
CONNECTICUT
The Connecticut Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of all four persons servingJLWOP sentences that was current as of
May 20, 2015.
The number of persons serving aJLWOP sentence provided by the
Connecticut Department of Corrections is outdated and should be zero.
The number should be zero because a 2015 state bill retroactively
outlawedJLWOP, eliminating allJLWOP sentences in Connecticut.sos
DELAWARE
The Delaware Department of Corrections provided complete
information on the five persons serving JLWOP sentences that was
current as of June 20, 2015. The Department indicated that four of
these five individuals are currently in the process of being
resentenced pursuant to recent legislation.o7
The number of persons serving aJLWOP sentence provided by the
Delaware Department of Corrections is misrepresentative of the
actual sentences that will be served. Delaware's 2013 juvenile
sentencing bill provides an opportunity for sentencing review in every
JLWOP case, effectively eliminating JLWOP, and specifies that it
applies retroactively.3 " Therefore, the number of JLWOP sentences
in Delaware, in practice, is zero.
The offense dates were provided not by the Delaware Department
of Corrections, but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
305. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(4) (b) (I) (2006) (amending § 18.1-3-401(4) (2002)).
306. See S.B. 796, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015) (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)); see also Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d
1031, 1033 (Conn. 2015) (holding that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review).
307. SeeDEL CODEANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d) (West, Westlaw through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 194).
308. See S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013) (amending DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4209, 4209-A, 4209-217(f), 3901(d)).
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The District of Columbia Department of Corrections has not yet
responded to our request for public information. Reports suggest,
however, that the District has zeroJLWOP prisoners.son
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has declined to provide information
in response to our Freedom of Information Act request. The United
States' brief in Montgomery, however, suggests that there are twenty-
seven inmates serving federalJLWOP sentences.310
FLORIDA
The Florida Department of Corrections provided an active inmate
database that was current as of July 29, 2015. We then isolated
individuals serving JLWOP sentences based on our own internal
calculations, which totaled at 227.
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence will likely
decrease because a recent Florida Supreme Court decision holds that
resentencing in accordance with Florida's amended post-Miller
statutes should be available to "all juvenile offenders whose sentences
are unconstitutional under Miller... ."" That statute no longer
makes JLWOP mandatory.
In the three cases for which the Florida Department of Corrections
did not provide an offense date, it was acquired through other
sources: namely, case law and news articles regarding the offenses.
GEORGIA
The Georgia Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of all twenty-five persons servingJLWOP sentences that was current as
of May 27, 2015. Georgia provided an updated list on August 11,
2015, after its original list erroneously included individuals who had
entered the penal system prior to age eighteen, but whose JLWOP
offenses occurred after the age of eighteen.
309. Se, e.g, THE SENTENCINGPROJECTJUVENILE LIFE WriHOurPAROLE, supra note 104, at 2.
310. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015) (No. 14-280).
311. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015); see H.B. 7035, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2014) (enacted FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082(1) (b), 921.1401 (West Supp.
2015)); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 395, 405 (Fla. 2015).
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HAWAII
The Hawaii Department of Corrections has confirmed that, as of
May 20, 2015, there are zero persons serving a JLWOP sentence.
Hawaii abolished JLWOP in 2014.112
IDAHO
The Idaho Department of Corrections provided a complete list of
the four persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of May
20, 2015. Because the Idaho Department of Corrections tracks only
sentence date and not offense date, the number is approximate. It
cannot account for inmates who were under eighteen at the time of
their JLWOP-qualifying offense, but who were not sentenced until
after reaching eighteen.
ILLINOIS
The Illinois Department of Corrections provided a complete list of
all ninety-three persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as
of June 29, 2015. The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence
in Illinois will likely decrease because in 2014, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review."'
Moreover, aJuly 2015 bill eliminated mandatoryJLWOP in Illinois.314
INDIANA
The Indiana Department of Corrections has confirmed that it has
zero-persons serving a JLWOP sentence current as of May 15, 2015.
Because the Indiana Department of Corrections tracks only sentence
date and not offense date, the number is approximate. It cannot
account for inmates who were under eighteen at the time of their
JLWOP-qualifying offense, but who were not sentenced until after
reaching eighteen. However, other sources suggest that this number
is in fact zero.
312. See H.B. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014) (amending HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 706-656(1), 657 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)).
313. See People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014).
314. See H.B. 2471, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015).
315. THE SENTENCING PROJECT,JUVENILE LIFE WrrHouT PAROLE, supra note 104, at 2.
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IOWA
The Iowa Department of Corrections provided complete
information on the two inmates serving JLWOP sentences that was
current as of September 4, 2015.
The number the Iowa Department of Corrections reported is
subject to change due to a 2013 Iowa Supreme Court ruling."'
Shortly after Miller, the Governor of Iowa commuted the sentences of
thirty-eight Iowan inmates serving statutorily mandated JLWOP
sentences to life with the possibility of parole after sixty years.' In
2013, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that these commutations were
unconstitutional pursuant to Miller because they constituted
functional JLWOP and were imposed with no individualized
consideration."1 s The court, therefore, ordered resentencings in all
thirty-eight cases, not all of which have occurred.319  Thus, the
number is subject to change, as Iowa retains discretionary JLWOP.
The offense date was provided not by the Iowa Department of
Corrections but from a news article regarding the offense. The
department provided commitment date instead of sentence date, as it
does not track sentence date.
KANSAS
Kansas no longer authorizes JLWOP, having abolished it in 2011.20
The Kansas Department of Corrections has confirmed that no person
is serving aJLWOP sentence in that state as of April 27, 2015.
KENTUCKY
The Kentucky Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of the two persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
May 2, 2015. Kentucky abolishedJLWOP in 1986.321
LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of all 247 persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as
ofJuly 20, 2015.
316. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 109-10 (Iowa 2013).
317. Id. at 110-11.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See KANSAs STAT. ANN. § 21-6618 (2011).
321. 1986 Ky. Acts 1056.
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MAINE
The Maine Department of Corrections has confirmed that no
person is serving aJLWOP sentence in that state as of May 20, 2015.
MARYLAND
The Maryland Department of Corrections provided complete
information regarding the nineteen persons serving JLWOP
sentences that was current as of August 2015.
MASSACHUSETTS
Massachusetts retroactively abolished JLWOP in 2015," and the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections has confirmed that no
person is serving aJLWOP sentence in that state as of May 28, 2015.
MICHIGAN
The Michigan Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of all 370 persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
September 30, 2015. Michigan may soon have no one serving
JLWOP, as the Eastern District of Michigan has held that Michigan's
parole procedures, which enforce mandatory JLWOP, violate Miller.
The state, however, has appealed.
MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of all seven persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as
of May 21, 2015. The offense dates were provided not by the
Minnesota Department of Corrections but from other sources:
namely, case law and news articles regarding the offenses.
The Minnesota Department of Corrections does not release
information regarding individual inmates' race.
MISSISSIPPI
The Mississippi Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of all sixty-eight persons serving JLWOP sentences that was
current as of May 20, 2015.
322. MASs. GEN. IAWs ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 2015) (amended by 2014 Mass. Acts
ch. 189, § 5); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 24 (West 2015) (amended by 2014
Mass. Acts ch. 189, § 6).
323. Se Hfllv. Snyder, No. 10-14568,2013 WL 364198, at*2-3 (E.D. Mich.Jan. 30,2013).
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The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in Mississippi
will likely decrease because in 2013, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review.3 24 Thus, the
reported number includes persons who are eligible for resentencing,
but have not yet undergone resentencing proceedings.
The offense dates were provided not by the Mississippi Department
of Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
MISSOURI
The Missouri Department of Corrections provided complete
information regarding the approximately 103 persons serving JLWOP
sentences as of August 14, 2015.
The number provided by the Missouri Department of Corrections
is approximate. The Department's system did not have the offense
date for some of the older sentences. In an effort to include all
possible JLWOP offenders, it ran the search as of age twenty-one or
less at the time of sentencing, assuming that most of the offenders
would have been sentenced within three years of the offense date.
This method could theoretically exclude an older juvenile who spent
considerable time awaiting a sentence or someone whose sentence
was imposed after retrial or resentencing.
The number of persons serving JLWOP in Missouri may go down,
as an intermediate appellate court in Missouri has held that Miller
applies retroactively on collateral review."' The case, however, has
been transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court for further review."'
Some Missouri offense dates were provided by outside sources:
namely, case law and news articles regarding the offenses.
MONTANA
The Montana Department of Corrections provided information on
the sole individual serving a JLWOP sentence that was current as of
May 29, 2015. On November 20, 2015, the Montana governor
granted clemency.2  Montana abolishedJLWOP in 2007.28
324. SeeJones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 700 (Miss. 2013).
325. See Branch v. Cassady, No. WD77788, 2015 WL 160718, at *10 (Mo.Jan. 13, 2015).
326. See id. at *1 (case transferred to Missouri Supreme Court on March 31, 2015).
327. See Laura Zuckerman, Montana Governor Grants Clemency in 36-Year-Old Murder,
REUTERs (Nov. 20, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/20/us-
montana-clemency-idUSKCNOT92W820151120#C7pOVV4rouzC2rdg.97.
328. S.B. 547, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2007).
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NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Department of Corrections provided an active
inmate database that was current as of May 20, 2015. We then
isolated individuals serving JLWOP sentences based on our own
internal calculations, which totaled at twenty-seven.
Because the Nebraska Department of Corrections tracks only
admission date and not offense or sentencing dates, the number is
approximate. The Nebraska data do not include inmates sentenced
to JLWOP who were under eighteen at the time of the offense, but
who were not admitted to the prison system after age eighteen. They
likely underreported the number of total JLWOP sentences. In
particular, they likely underreported the total number of JLWOP
sentences for offenses committed at age seventeen, as these are the
sentences most likely to be imposed after age eighteen.
However, the total number of persons serving aJLWOP sentence in
Nebraska is expected to decrease because in 2014, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that Miller should be given retroactive effect."
Thus, the Nebraska total includes persons whose sentences may be
reduced after a resentencing proceeding.
The offense dates were provided not by the Nebraska Department
of Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
NEVADA
The Nevada Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of all six persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
May 20, 2015.
Because the Nevada Department of Corrections tracks only
admission date and not offense or sentencing dates, the reported
number is approximate. The number does not capture inmates
sentenced to JLWOP who were under eighteen at the time of the
offense, but who were not admitted to the prison system until after
age eighteen. Accordingly, Nevada was able to provide age at
admission as opposed to age at the time of the offense.
However, Nevada has recently abolished JLWOP. The change in
law entitles current JLWOP prisoners to parole after having served
fifteen years.33s Thus, the number of persons serving a JLWOP
sentence provided by the Nevada Department of Corrections is
329. See State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 719 (Neb. 2014).
330. See A.B. 267, 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015).
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misrepresentative of the actual sentences that will be served. The
true number is zero. Accordingly, the Nevada Department of
Corrections lists upcoming parole hearings for each of the searchable
inmates on the list provided.
The offense dates were provided not by the Nevada Department of
Corrections, but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
The New Hampshire Department of Corrections provided a
complete list of the five persons serving JLWOP sentences that was
current as of May 20, 2015.
In 2014, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that four of the
five juveniles' mandatory JLWOP sentences were unconstitutional
under Miller, rendering them "entitled to the retroactive benefit of
the Miller rule in post-conviction proceedings."3 3 1
NEWJERSEY
The New Jersey Department of Corrections provided its entire
offender database that was current as of August 5, 2015, which
revealed no individuals serving aJLWOP sentence.
NEW MEXICO
The New Mexico Department of Corrections has confirmed that as
of May 20, 2015, no person was serving aJLWOP sentence in that state.
NEW YORK
The New York Department of Corrections declined to comply with
our request for information regarding its potential JLWOP inmates.
Reports suggest, however, that New York has zero individuals serving
such a sentence.3 2 Moreover, New York's JLWOP eligibility is limited
to acts of terrorism, and this does not appear to ever have been the
basis for aJLWOP sentence. 3
331. See In reNew Hampshire, 103 A.3d 227, 235-36 (N.H. 2014).
332. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 104,
at 2.
333. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 490.25 (McKinney 2013).
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NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina Department of Corrections provided a
complete list of the seventy-eight persons serving JLWOP sentences
that was current as ofJuly 20, 2015.
NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Department of Corrections provided complete
information on the one individual serving aJLWOP sentence that was
current as of May 20, 2015.
OHIO
The Ohio Department of Corrections provided complete
information regarding the five persons serving JLWOP sentences that
was current as ofJuly 2014.
The offense dates were provided not by the Ohio Department of
Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
OKLAHOMA
The Oklahoma Department of Corrections provided complete
information on the eleven individuals serving JLWOP sentences that
was current as of May 20, 2015.
Because the Oklahoma Department of Corrections tracks only
sentence date and not offense date, the number is approximate. It
cannot account for inmates who were under eighteen at the time of
their JLWOP-qualifying offense, but who were not sentenced until
after reaching eighteen.
The offense dates were provided not by the Oklahoma Department
of Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
OREGON
The Oregon Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of all four persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
May 20, 2015.
The offense dates were provided not by the Oregon Department of
Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
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PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of 376 persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
June 30, 2015. Because the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
tracks only sentence begin date (called "effective date of sentence")
and not offense date, the number is approximate.
As the original list was missing sentence date, we requested a
second list on September 18, 2015. The response included 698
entries, almost twice the original number. While we could not obtain
a clarification from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
regarding how they obtained the new number, it appears that the
first list included only inmates who were seventeen or younger at
their effective sentencing date, while the second list included those
eighteen or younger at the effective sentencing date to account for
inmates for whom there was a significant time lag between offense
date and effective sentence date. To acquire as accurate a number of
possible, we went through the larger list to capture individuals serving
JLWOP. Using news articles and/or published opinions to obtain
offense dates, and then calculating age at time of offense, we were
able to confirm that thirty-eight inmates from the larger list were
serving JLWOP. Therefore, our current number is 414 (the original
376, plus thirty-eight). The number is still approximate because it
may miss those whose offense date occurred before they reached
eighteen but who were not incarcerated until they were nineteen.
We obtained offense date and age of offense for as many of the 414
as were available via published opinion or news article. Where
unavailable, the effective date of sentence and age at effective date of
sentence is used in place of offense date and age at offense date.
RHODE ISLAND
The Rhode Island Department of Corrections has confirmed that
as of May 20, 2015, no person is serving a JLWOP sentence that was
imposed before the offender reached eighteen.
As the Rhode Island Department of Corrections does not track
offense date, it could not confirm that it has zero persons serving a
sentence ofJLWOP for an offense that occurred prior to the offender
turning eighteen. However, other sources suggest that this number is
in fact zero."'
334. THE SENTENCING PROJECT,JUVENILE LIFE Wm-IouT PARoLE, supra note 104, at 2.
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SOUTH CAROLINA
The South Carolina Department of Corrections provided a
complete list of all thirty-seven persons serving JLWOP sentences that
was current as of May 20, 2015.
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in South
Carolina will likely decrease because a 2015 South Carolina Supreme
Court case held that Miller was retroactive and requires all South
Carolina inmates servingJLWOP sentences to be resentenced."'
The offense dates were provided not by the South Carolina
Department of Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law
and news articles regarding the offenses.
SOUTH DAKOTA
The South Dakota Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of the three persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as
of May 21, 2015.
TENNESSEE
The Tennessee Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of the thirteen persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current
as of May 20, 2015.
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in Tennessee
will likely decrease because in 2014, a Tennessee appellate court held
that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review. 136
The offense dates were provided not by the Tennessee Department
of Corrections but from other sources: namely, case law and news
articles regarding the offenses.
TEXAS
The Texas Department of Corrections provided a complete list of
all seventeen persons servingJLWOP sentences that was current as of
May 21, 2015. As of 2013, Texas no longer authorizes JLWOP."
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in Texas will
likely decrease because in 2014, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review. 3 1
335. SwAiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572,573 (S.C. 2014), cef. denied 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015).
336. Dickerson v. State, 2014 WL 3744454, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App.July 28, 2014).
337. See S.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
12.31 (a) (West 2011).
338. See Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
600 [Vol. 65:535
2016] JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN LAW AND PRACTICE
UTAH
The Utah Department of Corrections does not track age at the time of
offense. However, it identified the two persons it considered as potentially
serving JLWOP sentences there. Based on independent reports, both of
these persons appear to have been less than eighteen at the time they
committed an offense subjecting them to aJLWOP sentence. 3 9
VERMONT
Vermont abolished JLWOP in 2015,ss and the Vermont
Department of Corrections has confirmed that no person is serving a
JLWOP sentence in that state as of May 28, 2015.
VIRGINIA
The Virginia Department of Corrections declined to comply with
our request for information regardingJLWOP inmates. Our count of
twenty-two persons subject to JLWOP there is based on a media
report from 2014. 341
WASHINGTON
The Washington Department of Corrections provided a complete
list of the twenty-two persons serving JLWOP sentences that was
current as ofJune 30, 2015.
The number of persons serving a JLWOP sentence in Washington
will likely decrease because Washington's 2013 post-Miller statutory
amendments entitle all persons currently subject to JLWOP to
resentencing.342 Since passage of the law, at least five inmates have
received sentences of less than JLWOP.
339. See State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55 (2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-7087
(U.S. Nov. 20, 2015); Utah Father Charged with Hiding Evidence in Arizona Murder Case,
KINGMAN DAILY MINER, Aug. 11, 2002, at A12 (Morris Mullins).
340. H.B. 62, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2015) (enacting VT. STAT. ANN. 13, § 7045
(2015)).
341. See Louis Hanson, Lawmakers, Activists Seek Reduced Sentence for Teen, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Dec. 3, 2013), http://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/lawmakers-activists-
seek-reduced-sentence-for-teen/article_61b02784-3856-5bb5-bbd8-
27a5294b1c36.html.
342. See S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013) (amending WASH. REV.
CODE §10.95.030(3)(a)(i) (West. Supp. 2015)) (entitling everyone serving
mandatoryJLWOP to a resentencing).
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WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia Department of Corrections has confirmed that
no person is serving a JLWOP sentence in that state as of May 28,
2015. In 2014, West Virginia abolished JLWOP.34 3
WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of the eight persons serving JLWOP sentences that was current as of
July 2012.
Because Wisconsin courts have treated Miller as applying
retroactively, the number in actuality is likely to be smaller."'
WYOMING
The Wyoming Department of Corrections provided a complete list
of the four persons servingJLWOP sentences that was current as of May
20, 2015. Wyoming abolished JLWOP in 2013. The total number of
persons serving JLWOP sentences may actually be zero, as the abolition
applies retroactively unless the person has assaulted a law enforcement
officer while in custody or has attempted to escape custody.345
343. See H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (enacting W. VA. CODE. ANN.
§§ 61-2-2, -14a, 62-3-15, -22, -23, 62-12-13(b)).
344. See State v. Sanders, 855 N.W.2d 720, *3 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014); State v.
Hampton, 842 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
345. See WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-101(b), -10-301(c) (2015).
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APPENDIX B
State Number Number ofJLWOP Sentences by Gender
of Inmates Race/Ethnicity (if disclosed) (if
Currentdy disclosed)
Serving
JLWOP_ _
Sentences
-1D5
Alabama 19 15 0 4 0 0 18 1
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 33 6 13 14 0 0 33 0
Arkansas 57 40 0 17 0 0 56 1
California .. 288 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Colorado .. 56 18 13 18 2 1 51 1
Connecticut 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 0
Delaware 5 4 0 1 0 0 5 0
Florida 34  227 135 12 78 0 0 213 12
Georgia 25 19 2 4 0 0 25 0
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idaho 4 0 0 4 0 0 3 1
Illinois"4 3  93 65 11 15 0 0 90 1
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iowa 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 0
Louisiana350  247 199 0 47 0 1 243 4
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maryland351  19 14 0 3 0 0 14 0
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Michigan352  370 260 8 98 2 0 357 11
Minnesota 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mississippi 68 47 0 21 0 0 67 1
Missouri 103 57 1 43 1 1 99 4
Montana 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
346. One person convicted as a juvenile without the possibility of parole has
subsequently had his or her sentence reduced.
347. Colorado did not disclose the race or gender of four of its inmates.
348. Florida did not disclose the race or gender of two of its inmates. Similarly, six
inmates' records indicate that he or she is "out of department custody by court order."
349. Illinois did not disclose the race or gender of two of its inmates.
350. These numbers reflect the total number of persons serving JLWOP
sentences. In some cases, however, an inmate received multiple JLWOP sentences
for different offenses. Including these sentences, the total number of JLWOP
sentences imposed in Louisiana is 271.
351. Maryland did not provide the race of two of its inmates.
352. Michigan did not provide the race or gender of two of its inmates.
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Nebraska 27 12 1 13 0 1 25 2
Nevadas.. 6 3 1 1 0 1 6 0
New 5 1 1 3 0 0 5 0
Hampshire
Newjersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York35 4  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North Carolina 78 59 6 9 4 0 77 1
North Dakota 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Ohio 5 2 0 3 0 0 5 0
Oklahoma 55  11 5 0 5 0 1 11 0
Oregon3 56  4 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
Pennsylvania 414 281 46 85 2 0 406 8
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South 37 24 0 9 2 0 35 1
Carolina357
South Dakota 3 0 0 2 0 1 3 0
Tennessee 13 7 0 6 0 0 12 1
Texas 17 13 4 0 0 0 16 1
Utah 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia3 5 22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Washington 22 1 0 16 3 2 22 0
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wisconsin 8 4 0 3 0 1 8 0
WyomingS59 4 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
Total3 " 2295 1303 120 531 17 10 1933 52
353. Recent change in law entitles currentJLWOP prisoners to parole after having
served fifteen years. See A.B. 267, 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015). Thus, the number of
persons serving a JLWOP sentence provided by the Nevada Department of
Corrections is misrepresentative of the actual sentences that will be served. The true
number is zero. Accordingly, the Nevada Department of Corrections lists upcoming
parole hearings for the searchable inmates on this list.
354. As noted supra notes 332-33, the New York Department of Corrections
declined to comply with our request for information regarding its potential JLWOP
inmates. Reports suggest, however, that New York has zero individuals serving such a
sentence. Moreover, New York's JLWOP eligibility is limited to acts of terrorism,
which does not appear to ever have been the basis for aJLWOP sentence.
355. Oklahoma had one additional African American, male inmate who
committed suicide while serving his sentence. Prison Inmate Commits Suicide,
NEWSON6 (Oct. 9, 2007, 12:50 PM), http://www.newson6.com/story/7732056/
prison-inmate-commits-suicide.
356. Oregon did not provide race and gender data for one inmate.
357. South Carolina had one inmate's race listed as "other" and did not provide
race or gender information for another inmate.
358. Virginia's Department of Corrections did not comply with the authors' FOIA
requests. The figure listed in Appendix B is based on a 2014 news report. See
Hanson, supra note 341.
359. One person convicted in Wyoming has been incarcerated out-of-state.
Wyoming did not provide race or gender information on this inmate.
360. We were not able to obtain race data for 311 inmates; similarly, we were not
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APPENDIX C
Number ofJLWOP Sentences by Gender
Race/Ethnicity (if disclosed) (if
disclosed)
Allegheny, PA 37 3 0 4 0 0 37 0
Cook, IL361  65 47 9 7 0 0 62 1
East Baton Rouge, LA 35 34 0 1 0 0 35 0
Harris, TX 11 9 2 0 0 0 10 1
Jefferson, LA 33 27 0 6 0 0 33 0
Los Angeles, CA 112 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Miami-Dade, FL6`2  30 20 0 9 0 0 30 0
Oakland, MI363  50 31 2 15 1 0 47 2
Orleans, LA 72 71 0 1 0 0 71 1
Philadelphia, PA 236 189 34 13 0 0 233 3
Sacramento, CA 23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
St. Louis City, MO 41 22 1 16 1 1 39 2
Wayne, MI 156 146 0 10 0 0 153 3
able to obtain gender data for 308 inmates.
361. Cook County, Illinois did not provide gender or race data for two of its inmates.
362. The Miami-Dade, Florida Department of Corrections did not provide race
and gender information for one inmate.
363. The Oakland, Michigan Department of Corrections did not provide race and
gender information for one inmate.
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